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Of Pigs and Parlors: Regulatory
Takings in the Coalfields
By

PATRICK C. MCGINLEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The rugged coal-laden hills and narrow valleys of Appalachia
may be the context for resolution of an important and complex
issue of constitutional law. The coal of that region has for more
than one hundred years produced great wealth for a few individuals and a major portion of the energy for homes and factories across the United States. The region has also borne the2
environmental degradation,
burden of coal-related labor strife,'
3 and poverty. 4
corruption
political

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.

See e.g., P. LONG, WHERE THE SUN NEVER SHINES: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
(1989) and V.B. HARRIS, KANAW-HA'S BLACK GOLD AND MINER'S
REBELLIONS (1987).
2 The legislative history of the "Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1974," a failed precursor of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA), identifies the impact of coal mining on many coalfield communities:
The .. . environmental impacts of surface and underground coal mining
have been enormous. The most serious effects are to be seen in the
Appalachian region, where the entire socio-economic infrastructure of parts
of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia and Tennessee
and Alabama has been profoundly affected by decades of extracting coal
from the rich bituminous deposits. As a consequence of the hazardous
environment associated with both underground and surface mining of coal,
the health and safety of people living and working near the coal mines of
the region are in more or less constant peril....
H.R. REP. No. 1072, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (1974).
1 Even as I write, the insidious corrupting influence of coal money has surfaced
in Appalachia, bringing disgrace and dishonor to public officials who allegedly took
part in extortion and kick-back schemes. Former three-term West Virginia Governor
Arch A. Moore Jr. and members of his administration stand accused of conspiring with
coal company executives to commit such repulsive crimes as bilking the West Virginia
Black Lung Benefits Fund of more than two million dollars at the expense of disabled
coal miners and widows. The former Governor has pled guilty to using the illegal
proceeds in his election efforts. See e.g., The Charleston Gazette, April 13, 1990, at 1.
4 See, e.g., H. CAUDIL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS, A BIOGRAPHY OF A
DEPRESSED AREA (1963).
BLOODY COAL INDUSTRY

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW

&

POLICY

[VOL. 5:473

Government intervention to protect coal miner's health and
safety5 and the homes and the environment of coalfield residents
is common. It is as common as the ubiquitous coal tipple which
dots the Appalachian landscape; 6 as common as the mountains
and fields ripped apart and abandoned by irresponsible coal
operators; and as common as the overloaded tri-axle coal trucks
that wind their way down the narrow broken roads of remote
hollows. 7 Government intervention came too late, however, to
prevent pollution of thousands of miles of streams and rivers
now stained orange and rendered biologically dead by sulfuric

See Reide, Historical Development of Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health
Regulation, 1 CoAL LAw AND REGULATION 1-1 - 1-60 (McGinley and Vish eds., 1983 &
Supp. 1989).
6 Coal tipples are structures used to load coal onto trucks, railcars, or barges for
transportation to coal purchasers. Coal tipples are to the coal fields what silos are to
the farming regions of the mid-west. See U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, A DICTIONARY OF
MINING, MINERAL AND RELATED TERMS (1968), p. 1145.
1 See e.g., West v. National Mines Co., 285 S.E.2d 670 (W.Va. 1981). One who
has not experienced the impact of the heavy over-loaded coal truck rumbling past her
home can not comprehend the intrusive nature of the activity. In West, the impact of
this experience is recited in stark terms:
Coal produced from National's leasehold is removed by contract haulers
who transport the coal by truck down route 8/1 past the appellants' house
to a preparation facility owned by National located approximately three
miles west of Pineville, West Virginia. The coal is hauled in large trucks
carrying 30 to 50 tons per load. The trucks run six days per week and
occasionally all night long. Route 8/1, the only access road between the
mine and National's preparation facility, is a dirt and gravel based road.
Consequently, much dust is created by the truck traffic in dry weather
conditions. The dust problem is exacerbated by the truck operators' practice
of travelling in packs of four or five trucks at a speed of approximately
30 miles per hour. The appellants' house sits close to the road and the
dust created by the trucks settles on the house and the surrounding property. Although the appellants have lived in their present house since ,1972,
Mr. West has lived at the same address for over 45 years. Mining operations
have been ongoing above the appellants' property for decades, but more
coal is being hauled out now than ever before.
The dust is ubiquitous. It permeates the house even with the doors and
windows closed. The evidence shows that the dust is oily and greasy, black
looking and hard to clean. It interferes with breathing. It spoils the food
raised by the appellants in their garden. It fouls the water, and prevents
the appellants from sleeping soundly. The oppressive conditions caused by
the dust were summarized by Mr. West: "It is hard to breathe. I tell you,
I've often thought about it like this: A man would be better off over there
in jail in solitary confinement than to have to put up with this kind of
conditions for the rest of his life. It is just that bad."
Id., 285 S.E.2d at 673-74.
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acid mine drainage' which pours from hillsides scarred by the
strip miner's giant shovels and pierced by the shafts of the

underground mine operator. For a century, the region has in the
Dickensian sense, suffered the "worst of times and the best of
times." 9
The existence of great mineral wealth in the midst of Appalachian poverty provides the backdrop for the following discussion of difficult constitutional issues. At the bottom lies the
basic conflict between private property ownership and the right
of a society to organize to further common community goals.' 0
In the present context, the focus is the implied right of government to "take" private property for a public use and the implied
right of government" to regulate private activities to protect the
2
public health, safety, morals and advance the general welfare.1
Specific constitutional protections of individual rights are also
implicated here: the Fifth Amendment's mandate that private
property can be appropriated by government only if "just compensation" is paid, and the Fifth Amendment's corollary mandate that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property,
without due process of law . . . ." '3
Narrowly viewed, at stake is the power of government to
pass laws that regulate the use of property so as to reduce or
eliminate its economic value. But such laws, be they to protect
the public health and safety from nuisance-like activities or to

I See e.g. McGinley & Sweet, Acid Coal Mine Drainage: Past Pollution and
Current Regulation, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 67 (1978); Begley and Williams, Coal Mine Water
Pollution: An Acid Problem with Murky Solutions, 64 Ky. L. J. 507 (1976).
9 DICKENS, TALE oF Two CITIES, 1 (1859). While the introductory comments
above suggest the region has suffered only the "worst of times," coal has often proved
a significant economic stimulus to coal-state economies and in more recent years has
provided rural coal workers with well-paying jobs. Coal state economies have, however,
experienced significant adverse consequences resulting from a recurring boom/bust cycle;
when coal is less marketable, tax dollars and jobs are correspondingly reduced.
,o The latter right, of course, includes the power to restrict private property rights.
" This government prerogative is commonly referred to as the police power. It
comprises the inherent powers of the sovereign that were not surrendered to the federal
government in the Constitution, but were reserved by the states under the Tenth Amendment. See e.g., 16 AM.JUR. 2D, Constitutional Law, § 360. The Congress acts similarly
under its enumerated powers, e.g., the Commerce Power upon which enactment of
SMCRA is based. For purposes of this article, I refer to "police power" as embodying
the powers of the states and Congress to enact health and safety legislation subject to
constitutional limitations.
,2 This is commonly called the power of "eminent domain".
'3 U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment also includes a due process
guarantee applicable to state government.
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regulate the use of land to further a comprehensive community
plan, may be reduced to one fundamental issue: who bears the
burden of the financial loss--the private property owner or the
broader community upon whose authority and pursuant to whose
consent the government has regulated?
Venting their frustrations, commentators and judges have
expounded on the difficulties one faces when exploring the relationship between the police power and the constitutional impediments to the "taking" of private property for a public use.14
As one commentator put it, "[iun truth, the collected decisions
of the Supreme Court, and all other courts, leave the subject as
disheveled as a ragpicker's coat."' 5 The Supreme Court has
recognized the complexity of the issue, describing the search for
a bright-line analysis in the takings area as follows: "[tihe attempt to determine when regulation goes too far that it becomes,
literally or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called 'the lawyer's
' 16
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark.""

" Twenty years ago, Professor Joseph Sax succinctly characterized this conflict:
Few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts as that
posed by the Constitution's requirement that private property not be taken
for public use without payment of just compensation. Despite the intensive
efforts of commentators and judges, our ability to distinguish between
"takings" in the constitutional sense, and exercises of the police power,
for which compensation is not compelled, has advanced only slightly since
the Supreme Court began to struggle with the problem some eighty years
ago.
Sax, Takings, Private property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J.149 (197 1)(notes omitted). In a more recent restatement of the same problem, Professor Richard Epstein
observed:
The two sides of the general debate are well marked. On the one hand,
private property has often been praised as the bulwark of individual liberty,
to be held sacred and inviolate against any and all intrusions. On this view,
its protection becomes, as it was for Locke, the raison d'etre for the state.
On the other hand, private property has been attacked as the mark of
social privilege--indeed theft-that allows the lucky few to dominate the
unfortunate many. It becomes the social institution that marks mankind's
fall from grace. Neither of these extreme positions can be maintained. But
quickly having ruled out the extremes, there remains open the difficult and
vexing task of marking the intermediate path.
Epstein, Takings: Decent and Resurrection, 1987 SUPREMM COURT REVtEw 1. For a more
lengthy presentation of Prof. Epstein's controversial views, see EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAN (1985).
,1Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1057, 1059 n. 11 (1980).
16Williamson Co. Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 199, n.17 (1985), citing C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed.
1976). In a familiar incantation in Supreme Court takings opinions, Justice Brennan has
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Notwithstanding the long held perception of the police power/
taking conflict as a morass of conceptual confusion which can
only be resolved on an ad hoc, case by case basis, recent caselaw
developments have brought some order to the debate. This article
will examine taking jurisprudence in light of these developments
and apply it in the context of what has, heretofore, been considered a most difficult environmental regulatory issue. That
issue centers on the "valid existing rights" caveat to a provision
of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
17
1977 (SMCRA).
Section 522(e) of the SMCRA prohibits by statutory fiat, the
mining of coal within certain distances from buildings, roads,
cemeteries and other surface land features and also declares
specific federal lands to be off-limits to coal mining." These

stated that:
[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(citations omitted).
11Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 522(e), 91 Stat. 507 (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)
(1988)).
,1 Section 522(e) of the SMCRA provides in relevant part:
(e) After August 3, 1977, and subject to valid existing rights no surface
coal mining operations except those which exist on August 3, 1977, shall
be permitted(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park
System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National System of
Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and
Scenic Rivers System, including study rivers designated under section
1276(a) of Title 16 and National Recreation Areas designated by Act
of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest:
Provided, however, That surface coal mining operations may be permitted on such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no significant
recreational, timber, economic, or other values which may be incompatible with such surface mining operations and(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground
coal mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to
lands which do not have significant forest cover within those National Forests west of the 100th meridian, that surface mining is in
compliance with the Multiple-Use Sustained- Yield Act of 1960 [16
U.S.C. §§ 528-531], the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
1975, the National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the provisions of this chapter: And provided further, That no surface coal
mining operations may be permitted within the boundaries of the
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restrictions apply "subject to valid existing rights." Attempts to
interpret this phrase has spawned a dozen years of Department
of the Interior rulemaking 9 and attendant litigation, while homes,
cemeteries, schools, highways and the integrity of some of the
nation's natural treasures including some National Parks and
Forests hang in the balance.
As I write, almost thirteen years after enactment of the
SMCRA, the extent to which a coal operator possesses "valid

existing rights," and thus may blast, strip, auger, and construct
haul roads and sediment ponds in areas where such activity is
otherwise proscribed by the SMCRA remains unresolved.
Throughout this extended rulemaking the Department of Interior's Office of Surface Mining has consistently identified congressional concerns that section 522(e) not effect a taking, as the
central issue guiding agency efforts to craft an acceptable regu-

lation implementing that section's prescriptive mandate. 20
It was to OSM that Congress gave the responsibility to see
that SMCRA is effectively implemented. SMCRA envisioned
that ultimate front-line authority for stripmine enforcement would
rest with states who would implement OSM promulgated regulations with federal oversight of state actions. The agency's first
decade of existence was marked with controversy and criticism.

Custer National Forest;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or places
included in the National Register of Historic Sites unless approved
jointly by the regulatory authority and the Federal, State, or local
agency with jurisdiction over the park or the historic site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any
public road, except where mine access roads or haulage roads join such
right-of-way line and except that the regulatory authority may permit
such roads to be relocated or the area affected to lie within one hundred
feet of such road, if after public notice and opportunity for public
hearing in the locality a written finding is made that the interests of
the public and the landowners affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived
by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public
building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public
park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). (emphasis in original).
" See 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988) which outlines the history of this extended
rulemaking.
- SMCRA § 511, 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1988) created a new Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") to implement, administer and enforce the Act
and to oversee the efforts of state regulatory agencies which receive primary jurisdiction
to enforce the statute.
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The agency and, in turn, its implementing regulatory program
were created by Carter Administration officials. The original
Carter OSM staff were characterized by coal industry spokesmen
2
as environmental activists, imperious, hostile and dictatorial. '
The coal industry was delighted, however, when President
Reagan replaced Carter and OSM's attempts to promulgate regulations to implement SMCRA fell into the hands of James
Watt and his aides. 22 Secretary Watt proposed regulatory amendments that seriously challenged the underlying policies of
SMCRA. 23

Congressman Morris Udall, a leading proponent of the enactment of SMCRA viewed OSM's new direction with alarm,
fearing "a devastating impact on the goals we set ... in this
law." 24 Another commentator observed that Secretary Watt was
21 In an article setting forth their coal industry clients' view of OSM rulemaking
under the Carter Administration, two Washington lawyers stated:
The activist, pace-setting role OSM has played as regulation promulgator
in determining the alpha and omega of state programs has been mirrored
and reinforced by OSM's role in reviewing and approving state programs.

OSM's imperious manner and general lack of grace in performing the state
program review and approval function generated considerable hostility on
Such was the hue and cry that legislation was
the part of the states ....
proposed to free the states entirely from OSM's dictatorial regulations.
Macleod and Means, The Federal Threat to State Primacy and Effective Reclamation
Under the Surface Mining Act, 2 E. Min. L. INST. 5-1, 5-24 - 5-25 (1981).
- The coal industry applauded Watt's plan to reorganize OSM's Regulatory program. See Reorganization of the Office of Surface Mining: Oversight Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-150 (1981) ("Reorganization Hearing") (Joint
statement of the National Coal Association and American Mining Congress Committee
on Surface Mining Regulations). The Watt-OSM rulemaking overhaul included several
hundred proposed rule changes involving sixty percent of the agency's regulations. See
47 Fed. Reg. 1709 (1982); See also, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TULANE
L. REV. 299, at 335 (1983).
23 Comment, Regulatory Revisions to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act: An Exercise in Administrative Legislation?, 31 KAN. L. REV. 279, 280 (1983). (This
commentary explores environmentalists' charges that "the OSM has abdicated its congressionally mandated duties by loosening regulatory requirements in vital areas.") Id.
at 280, n. 10.
' ReorganizationHearing at 7. One commentator observed at the time that:
The implications of the new administration's philosophies . . . were not
well received by [those] interested in effective surface mining regulation.
Many viewed the deregulation and "new federalism" rhetoric as thinlyveiled proposals to return the industry to the dark ages of state competitors
for mining business ....
Comment, Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TU.ANE L. REV. at 334.
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on a "mission... to accomplish a... vivisection of OSM "by
creating turmoil and uncertainty in the agency. 25 Secretary Watt's
resignation, conservationist court victories and the end of the
Reagan administration prevented the implementation of the Watt
OSM reorganization plan.
The following discussion analyzes the impact of Section 522(e)
of the SMCRA on private property rights and applies recently
clarified "taking" precedent in reaching the conclusion that the
law's mandate may be enforced without "taking" private property and triggering the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement.2 6 To reach this view I explore the nuances of SMCRA and

Section 522(e) in light of more than one hundred years of
Supreme Court taking jurisprudence. Hopefully this discussion
will also provide some assistance in resolving the confusion
surrounding constitutional taking jurisprudence.
II.

THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF

1977 AND VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
One cannot address the police power/taking issue raised in
the context of SMCRA's section 522(e) without at least a threshold appreciation of the history and purpose of the legislation.
SMCRA was enacted after years of acrimonious debate in the
public arena and in Congress. 27 The often bitter struggle pitted
coalfield residents, responsible coal operators, some state gov-

Seiberling, How Effective is the Federal Stripmining Law?, 88 W. VA. L. REv.
509, 511-512 (1986). Congressman Seiberling believed that "[Iawlessness and non-compliance with SMCRA are widespread in the Appalachian coal fields." Id. at 512. See
also, Dunlap and Lyon, Effectiveness of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act: Reclamation or Regulatory Subversion, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 547 (1986).
26 There may be some cases where a "taking" will occur but such instances will,
in my view, be rare.
27 The legislative process included 183 days of hearings and legislative consideration, eighteen days of actions in the House of Representatives, three House-Senate
conferences and reports, eleven committee reports, two presidential vetoes and more
than fifty recorded votes in the House and Senate. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface
Mining Central and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553,
554 (1979). See, A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W. VA.
L. REv. 775 (1979) (hereafter referred to as "Summary of the Legislative History");
Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TULANE L. Rev. 299, 311-312; Comment,
Regulatory Revisions to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Exercise
In Administrative Legislation?, 31 KAN. L. REv. 279, 280-282 (1983); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-280 (1981).
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ernments, conservationists and their allies in Congress against
other coal operators, coal trade associations and industry friends
in state government and Congress.
The legislative history of SMCRA contains extensive evidence
of coal industry resistance to federal regulation. The post-World
War II development of modern stripping technology and giant
mining equipment greatly magnified the adverse impacts of unregulated and under-regulated coal mining. Congress emphatically rejected the claims of irresponsible operators 28 and their
supporters that federal intervention was not necessary to stem
the tide of strip mine ravages that swept across the coalfields in
the post-war period:
[DJespite claims from some quarters that State reclamation
laws have improved so significantly that federal mining standards are no longer needed, the hearing record abounds with
evidence that this is simply not the case. For a variety of
reasons, including the reluctance of State to impose stringent
29
controls on its own industry, serious abuses continue.
The legislative history of the SMCRA is replete with evidence
of the devastating impact of strip and underground coal mining
on coalfield communities:
Tragically, coal mining in America has left its crippling mark
upon the very communities which labored most to produce the
energy which once impelled the Nation's industrial plants and
now generates much of its electrical power ...
Acid mine drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000 miles
of streams; loss of prime hardwood forest and the destruction
of wildlife habitat by strip mining; the degradation of productive farmland; recurrent landslides; siltation and sedimentation
of the river systems; ...

and perpetually burning waste dumps-

30
these constitute a pervasive and far reaching ambience.

SMCRA was intended to put an end to the adverse impacts
of coal mining. Notwithstanding Congress' intentions, coal minThe terms "responsible" and "irresponsible operators" are words of art in the
coal industry. Responsible operators are often characterized as those coal companies
who seek to comply with environmental laws; irresponsible operators are those that
flaunt the law while creating environmental and safety hazards which remain after mining
has ceased because the mining company has failed to properly reclaim the minesite.
1st Sess. 58 reprinted at 1977 U.S. CODE,
29 H.R. REp. No. 218, 95th Cong.,
CoNG. & ADmIN NEWS 593, 596.
, Id.
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ing's detrimental effects did not cease with the enactment of the
SMCRA. After more than a decade of regulation under the Act,
ineffective state regulation and weak federal oversight have allowed irresponsible coal operators to continue many of the practices which provided the impetus for the enactment of
SMCRA. 31
In view of continued systemic obstacles to the effectuation
of sound mining and reclamation practices throughout the coal
fields, Congress' decision to place certain areas, identified in
Section 522(e), off-limits to mining, seems wise indeed. 2 Although Congress created a process in Section 522(c) of SMCRA
which gives OSM and state regulatory agencies discretionary
authority to ban all or some types of mining in certain areas
including federal lands, it observed that the Section 522(e) "decision to bar surface mining in certain circumstances is better
made by Congress itself." 33
A.

Valid Existing Rights in Legislation Enacted Prior to
SMCRA

Prior to the enactment of the SMCRA, the term "valid
existing rights ' 3 4 was a term of art in federal law, developed in
the context of and applicable only in situations involving the
acquisition of private interests in federal public lands. For example, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 contained VER lan-

31 For example, in Pennsylvania, more than 20,000 acres of mined land has been
abandoned by coal operators without reclamation since the enactment of the SMCRA.
Because of continued inadequate reclamation bonding requirements imposed by that
state's -regulatory authority (with the approval of OSM), Pennsylvania taxpayers are
being forced to provide more than $100,000,000 to offset the shortfall between the
amount collected from forfeit bonds and the actual cost of reclamation. Cited in an
unpublished report of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources dated
January, 1984. See e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SURFACE MINING: INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT AND STATES COULD IMPROVE INSPECTION PROGRAMS (Dec. 1986) (GAO Doc.

No. RCED-87-40).
Signs that federal enforcement of the SMCRA will be significantly strengthened by
the appointment of a new Director of the Office of Surface Mining by President George
Bush have been observed by coalfield observers, See, The Charleston Gazette, January
13, 1990.
11 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 reprintedat 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 631. Such lands include national parks and forests, and homes,
cemetaries and other surface features situate on private land. For text of SMCRA §
522(e), see supra note 18.
33

Id.

3 Hereinafter referred to as "VER."
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guage.3 5 There, VER was intended to preserve the mining claims
of those who accepted Congress' offer in the 1872 Mining Law
and had literally staked their claim and conducted prospecting
and other mineral development activities on federal lands. If a
claimant did not possess VER, the 1920 Act would operate so
as to extinguish the claim. More than one hundred other federal
enacted over the past
statutes relating to federal public lands
36
century have contained VER language.
One commentary on the respective rights and obligations of
those holding private interests in public resources has observed
that the parameters of "valid existing rights" created by federal
legislative or executive action depends upon the specific governmental motives underlying each.17 The authors of that work
make clear that there is no talismanic thread discoverable in the
crazy-quilt of federal statutes and executive orders which have
utilized "valid existing rights" language as part of a federal
lands regulatory scheme:
Typically, Congress never lists what interests it means to include within the "valid existing rights" phrase. The task of
interpretation thus falls on the executive branch (i.e., the Department of the Interior) or the courts."t

11 Act of Feb. 25, 1920, c. 85, § 36, 41 Stat 451 (codified as amended, 30 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1988)).
36 See e.g., Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377,
§ 4, 90 Stat. 1083 (amending, subject to valid existing rights, the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act § 2(b), codified as 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1988)); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 14(g), 85 Stat. 702 (codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1601, 1613
(g) (1982)); The Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 4(d)(3), 78 Stat. 890
(codified as 16 U.S.C. 1131, 1133 (1988)); and the Missions Indian Relief Act, Act of
Jan. 12, 1891, c. 65, § 2, 26 Stat. 712 (uncodified). VER has also been invoked in
Executive Orders whose purpose, generally stated, was similarly to preserve pre-existing
private interests in federal minerals or land from executive or statutory withdrawal. See
e.g., Exec. Order No. 1538, May 28, 1912 (withdrawing public lands for establishment
of the Papago Indian Reservation, Pinal Co., Az.); Exec. Order No. 4109, Dec. 8, 1924
(withdrawing from entry certain islands located off of the Florida coast); and Exec.
Order No. 6909, Nov. 21, 1934 (designating grazing areas).
3" Laitos and Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interest in Public
Resources, It HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987).
3s Laitos and Westfall identify six "classes" of property interests used by courts
and agencies when they label the range of such interests that private parties may acquire
from the federal government. According to the authors, these include vested rights, nonvested protectible property rights, protected possessory interests, non-discretionary entitlements, rights of possession, and applications. These six categories are discussed in the
context of an examination of the impact on each resulting from federal government
attempts to extinguish, or prevent acquisition of, one of these interests, or when it seeks
to place additional regulatory burdens upon such existing interests. Id. at 9-19.
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It is not possible to identify in the abstract every interest that
is a valid existing right. One must in each case consider the
nature and terms of the interest alleged to be a valid existing
right, the case law and administrative decisions that have previously considered whether that interest is a valid existing right,
and the precise language and history of the statute or executive
order acknowledging the valid existing right.3 9
Thus, one may safely conclude that an examination of the term
VER as used in other statutes will shed little light on how it
should be interpreted in the federal Surface Mining Act. While
far from determinative of the appropriate scope and meaning of
VER in Section 522(e), the legislative history of the SMCRA
provides some clues.
B.

Valid Existing Rights and SMCRA: Legislative History

Reflective of the intensity of the struggle leading to the
enactment of the SMCRA 40 is the fact that opponents of federal
regulation of coal stripping successfully induced President Gerald
Ford to twice veto bills passed by substantial margins. 41 It was
only in the wake of the election of a new President in the fall
of 1976 that the legislative effort finally bore fruit.
From the time Congress first entertained the notion of federal regulation of the environmental effects of coal mining until
enactment of the SMCRA, almost ten years had passed. 42 Not
surprisingly, the legislative history of SMCRA which accumu-

19 Id. at 20 (citations omitted). For other commentary on valid existing rights, see
generally, Toffenitti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND AND WATR
L. RFv. 31 (1985); Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals; Defining 'Valid Existing

Rights', 3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 517 (1988); Barkeley and Albert, A Survey of Case Law
Interpreting "Valid Existing Rights" -Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1 (1988); McFerrin and Whitman, Valid Existing Rights
and the Constitution; 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L. REy. 947 (1985); McGinley, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Ten Years of Promise
and Problemsfor the National Parks, in OuR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL

PARKS (J. Simon ed., 1988).
, See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
4 See Summary of Legislative History, supra note 27, at 777-778. See also, Surface
Mining Veto Justification: Briefing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the
Environment and the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

41 The legislative history of SMCRA, which began with hearings in 1968, is
capsulized in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264,
278, n. 19 (1981).
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lated during the balance of a decade of legislative consideration,
totals thousands of pages. Buried in these volumes are scant and
conflicting references to VER. In those places where VER is
discussed, precious little guidance is discernible which can inform
as to the meaning of and manner in which Congress intended
4
the term to be applied. 1

The legislative history does explicitly reveal a congressional
intent to follow state law guidance regarding the interpretation
of coal severance deeds. 44 In almost every jurisdiction which has
confronted the question, state courts have held that the right to
conduct strip mining operations is not granted by a coal severance deed unless the document of conveyance clearly and ex45
plicitly grants such a right.
Given such sparce legislative history, 46 it is necessary to glean
legislative intent from other sources. Indeed, utilizing commonly

41 The House Report on the Ninety-Fifth Congress version of SMCRA does contain
the following perspective on the valid existing rights proviso of § 552(e) only as it relates
to National Forest lands:
As subsection 522(e) prohibits surface coal mining in lands within the
boundaries of national forest subject to valid existing rights it is not the
intent, nor is it the effect of this provision to preclude surface coal mining
on private inholding within the national forests.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 95 reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADuN4. NEws 593, 631.
This statement suggests section 522(e)'s per se prohibitions are made "subject to"
certain rights of those owning private "inholdings" (i.e., land held in fee simple absolute), located within the boundaries of a national forest. It is not uncommon for such
inholdings to occur as islands of private property within the boundaries of many federal
land units. There are a variety of reasons for the existence of such isolated parcels; an
example would be the straightforward situation where federal land managers purchased
or were granted a large parcel of private land which surrounded property owned by a
third party.
The House Report does not suggest an automatic exemption from the prohibitions
(or anything else) with regard to private inholdings within the boundaries of other types
of important federal lands which are protected by the per se prohibitions of SMCRA §
552(e)(1).
" The House Committee Report indicates that the VER language of SMCRA §
552(e) "is intended . . . to make clear that the prohibition of strip mining on the national
forests is subject to previous court interpretations of valid existing rights." H.R. Rep.
No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws,
593, 631-632. The House report gives United States v. Polino, [133] F. Supp. 722 (N.D.
W.Va. 1955), as an example of the Congress' intent to follow this well established rule
of. mineral law. Said the Committee: "The phrase 'subject to valid existing rights' is
thus in no way intended to open up national forest lands to strip mining where previous
legal precedents have prohibited stripping. "H.R. REP. No. 218.
"1See generally, 4 COAL LAW AND REGULATION, § 81.01[3] (McGinley and Vish,
ed. 1983).
- Only one other portion of the Act's legislative history provides the basis for an
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recognized rules of statutory construction, the language of the
statute itself should be the first source to examine.
The words of Section 522 itself strongly suggest that the term
"subject to valid existing rights" was intended to require more
than the bare ownership of coal or the right to mine it. 47 This
becomes apparent when one examines the entire language of the
Section, not just the per se prohibitory language.
Thus, an interpretation of Subsection (e) must include consideration of Subsection 522(a) which allows regulatory authorities the discretionary power to designate certain land as offlimits for all or some types of mining. 48 Such designations are
made subject to a caveat different than VER; they are subject
to, in the words of the statute, "substantial legal and financial
commitments." ' 49 The legislative history of SMCRA reveals that
Congress intended Section 522(a)'s "substantial legal and finan-

cial commitments" to require more than "mere ownership or
acquisition cost of the coal itself or the right to mine it.s ° It is

educated guess as to Congress' specific intent regarding how application of VER relates
to mining on private lands. On the Senate side of the Ninety-Fifth Congress, its
Committee Report emphasized that the Section 522(e)(4) and (5) prohibitions of mining
on private land near certain surface features like schools and cemeteries were included
"for reasons of public health and safety . . . " S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
55 (1977). This remark supports the argument that the "buffer zone" per se restrictions
on mining found in Sections 522(e)(3)-(5), are intended to protect the public from the
nuisance effects of coal mining. See infra text accompanying note 120 for a discussion
of the significance of governmental exercises of the police power to abate nuisances.
"' Laitos and Westfall observe that
[I]f a vested right means fee title previously acquired from the government,
or legal or equitable rights to a fee title, then the inclusion of "valid
existing rights" language in the statute or executive action is redundant;
the vested right is presumably already protected from subsequent changes
in the law by the Fifth Amendment [eminent domain/taking clause].
Laitos and Westfall, supra note 37, at 19.
41 SMCRA § 522(a); 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1988).
49OSM has defined "substantial legal and financial commitments" to mean:
[slignificant investments that have been made on the basis of a long-term
coal contract in power plants, railroads, coal-handling, preparation, extraction or storage facilities and other capital-intensive activities. An example would be an existing mine, not actually producing coal, but in a
substantial stage of development prior to production. Costs of acquiring
the coal in place or of the right to mine it without an existing mine, as
described in the above example, alone are not sufficient to constitute
substantial legal and financial commitments.
30 C.F.R. § 762.5 (1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,344 (1979).
10 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
NEws 593, 631.
CONG. & ADrm.
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logical to conclude that the term "valid existing rights" in Section 522(e) was intended to be construed at least as strictly, and
probably more strictly than "substantial legal and financial commitments;" the intention being to provide assurance that public
lands of the greatest importance would receive optimum protection-consistent with the Constitution.
It seems beyond cavil that Congress' intention to protect
such precious natural gems as National Parks, Wildlife Refuges,
and National Monuments must have been much greater than its
concern, albeit significant, for the wide range of places not near
or at least dear to the collective national heart. 5 ' In essence, it
could be said that Congress has equated these areas of special
concern with nuisance law's apocryphal parlor which any reasonable person would agree is off-limits to pigs. 5 2 Blasting, the
dragline, coal trucks and the coal tipple are as out of place in
National Parks as the pig is in the parlor. Other locales could
be protected from coal mining nuisances by the Section 522(a)
discretionary designation process.
C.

Nexus Between the Constitution and Valid Existing Rights
in SMCRA

In its preamble to the first round of rulemaking relative to
Section 522(e), the Office of Surface Mining53 identified the
major congressional concern which the agency felt constrained
to address in deciding on the form and content of a regulation
needed to implement that section's limitation of mining:
[Tihe legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress
wanted to avoid any "taking in the implementation of section
1,While the per se prohibitions of mining on private lands would not, at first
blush, seem to fit this argument, logic suggests that members of Congress believed that
coal mining with attendant blasting, coal truck traffic, noise, dust, and subsidence would
almost universally be viewed by reasonable people to create a public nuisance intolerable
within a short distance from such surface features as homes, cemeteries, schools, public
highways, and the like. Common sense compels the conclusion that Congress similarly
saw no reason to make prohibition of mining in those buffer zones subject to a
discretionary bureaucratic designation process.
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, at 388 (1926). Justice
Sutherland's characterization of a nuisance as the equivalent of a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard has been used by judges and scholars for more than half of a
century to succinctly describe the essence of a common law nuisance. See infra, discussion
at note 142.
11 The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (hereafter "OSM")
was created by SMCRA to implement and oversee the administration of the Act. SMCRA
§ 201, 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1988).
12
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522(e) (Congressional Record, April [29, 1977, H-12,878). There
Congressman Udall opposed an amendment to delete the VER
clause from the Act. He stated that if VER were deleted, the
Act would not preserve valid legal rights which could not be
done without "paying compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Thus, OSM has endeavored to
determine the point at which payment would be required because a taking had occurred, then to define "valid existing
which cannot be
rights" in those terms, i.e., those rights
4
affected without paying compensation.1
This view of the rationale underlying the VER caveat is
entirely consistent with common sense, the legislative history of
SMCRA, and prior congressional usage of the term in other
statutes.55 Consistently, the goal of avoiding a compensable taking has been a central purpose guiding agency drafters of VER
56
regulatory language.
Thus, the controversy over the extent to which the per se
ban effected by Section 522(e) can actually serve to protect the
specified lands from harmful coal mining activities devolves
down to the question: to what extent can such lands be shielded
from mining activities without triggering a judicial finding that
such a ban constitutes a compensable taking? If a confident
answer can be given to such an inquiry, the answer would greatly
assist identification of the parameters of a sound OSM regulation
to implement Section 522(e).
In my view, such an answer can be given with a significant
degree of confidence; the answer as explained below, is that
"valid existing rights" can and should be construed narrowly to
protect the vast majority of lands, as identified in Section 522(e),

1144 Fed. Reg. 14902, 14992 (1979). Rep. Morris Udall was a principal sponsor
of SMCRA.
5 Indeed, while OSM subsequently has tried on several other occasions to redraft
its original VER definition, each of its attempts has focused on the taking issue as a
crucial concern propelling the rulemaking. See regulatory history of VER rulemaking,
supra note 19.
16 As Laitos and Westfall have explained:
Ascertaining the precise scope of a "valid existing rights" phrase is often
quite difficult prior to litigation. Nevertheless, it is possible to articulate
some general rules of interpretation. First, one of the principal purposes
of a "valid existing rights" provision is to assure that the operation of the
subsequent law will not create a taking which must be compensated under
the Fifth Amendment."
Laitos and Westfall, supra. note 37, at 59 (notes omitted).
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without the ban being construed to be a compensable taking."
III.

TAKING BY EMINENT DomAiN AND BY DEPRIVATION OF
DUE PROCESS

A.

A Century of Supreme Court Jurisprudence

A partial answer to the takings riddle does exist. The key
lies in a sound appreciation for the purposes of and the relationship between three separate constitutional considerations: the
Fifth Amendment's "due process" and "just compensation"
(eminent domain) clauses, and the implied "police power" inherent in the governance of a sovereign state.58
The police power, as observed below,5 9 is the basic authority
of government to legislate in the public interest--a power which
emanates, not from a specific provision of the Constitution, but
from the fundamental purpose motivating societies to eschew
unstructured individual freedom for the collective security offered by organized government. Of course, it is the police power
(that underlies regulatory acts) which are claimed to be unconstitutional takings.
When "takings" are discussed, the most obvious reference
is to the Fifth Amendment's literal use of the words: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '" 60 This clause of the Fifth Amendment evokes recognition of the implied power of eminent domain-the inherent
sovereign power to physically take or occupy private property
for public uses such as a road or a government building. The
framers accepted such usurpation of private property rights as a
legitimate exercise of governmental power if the property owner
61
received fair payment for the property taken.
A second clause of the Fifth Amendment is also implicated
in takings analysis. The due process clause provides that "[n]o
11Moreover, should any such prohibition be considered a taking, the parameters
of the "just compensation" principle imbedded in the Fifth Amendment should compel
only modest payments to cure such an otherwise unconstitutional act. See, generally
Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power, Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUMBIA L. REv. 1021. (1975).
" See infra, note 11, and accompanying text.
9 See infra, note 67, and accompanying text.
6oU.S. CONST. amend. V..
62See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946); R. BossELMAN, D.
CA.LIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE (1973); Kartovil & Harrison, Eminent DomainPolicy and Concept, 42 U. CAL. L. REv. 596 (1954).
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person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . -62 While the fact has been largely ignored
for decades, it is clear that there can be "takings" in the context
of the just compensation/eminent domain clause, as well as when
private property is "taken" in violation of the due process
clause. 63 The latter point has been obscured by commentators
and judges in modern discussions of constitutional takings jurisprudence. They have failed to recognize the clear due process
basis underlying the Court's seminal modern taking case, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. 64
For one to comprehend and evaluate contemporary takings
analysis, some understanding of the historical development of
legal concepts of the police and eminent domain powers, and
due process, is a necessary prerequisite.
B.

Early Interpretation of the Just Compensation/Eminent
Domain Clause

In the first century and a half of governance under the
Constitution, the Fifth Amendment's just compensation mandate
was considered to be properly invoked only when land was
actually seized by the government. It was not until the turn of
the twentieth century, in the throes of the industrial revolution,
that courts began to expand the meaning of the just compensation/eminent domain clause beyond its original meaning. 65 Until
that time, it was generally agreed that "[T]o entitle the owner
to protection under this clause the property must actually be
taken in the physical sense of the word . . . . ,
The protective reach of the Fifth Amendment eminent domain/just compensation clause, then, was originally limited by
its literal meaning. When government physically took private

U.S. CoNsT. amend. V..
" See Williamson Country Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 197, n. 15, (1985) (citing commentators who espouse this
view). See also Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594,
350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y. S.2d 5 (1976).
- 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
65 F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra, note 60, at 51. The authors quite
accurately refer to the era as "a period of conflict between freewheeling growth and
expansion and an emerging concern that government regulation was needed ...." Id.
T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456-57 (2d ed. 1874),
reprinted 1980. See also Commonwealth v. Alger, 66 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1853).
AND CONSTRUCTION
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property for some purpose which entailed actual use by the

public, the owner of private property would receive just compensation or the government act allowing such confiscation would
be judicially nullified.
C.

Early Interpretation of the Police Power
Early cases delineated the breadth of the police power:
The police power includes all measures for the protection of
the life, the health, the property, and the welfare of the inhabitants, and for the promotion of good order and the public
morals. It covers the suppression of nuisances, whether injurious to the public health, like unwholesome trades, or to the
public morals, like gambling houses and lottery tickets. The
power, being essential to the maintenance of the authority of
local and to the safety and welfare of the people, is inalienable
.... The supervision of both these subjects of governmental
power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with
as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot
divest itself .... 67

This expansive view of the police power, having been narrowed
during the first three decades of this century, 68 was resuscitated

in post-Depression years; today courts accord similar deference
to its exercise as they did in the late nineteenth century. Only in69
the area of taking law and infringement of fundamental rights
has such deference been displaced.

61 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 128 (Gray, J., dissenting) (1890). See also, Noble
State Bank v. Haskel, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). At the turn of the century, Ernst Freund
effectively described the reach of the police power:
The state ... exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and
anticipation of wrong by narrowing common-law rights through conventional restraints and positive regulations which are not confined to the
prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this . . . kind of state control that
constitutes the essence of the police power.
E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER (1904).
"' See infra, discussion of Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and substantive
due process at note 79 and accompanying text.
69 The deferential standard of judicial review afforded police power enactments
does not extend to cases where such laws are alleged to have infringed fundamental
rights. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), Moore
v. City of East Cleveland 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The remaining sections of this article
explain how the standard of judicial review in "due process taking" cases has become
more instrusive.
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Early Views of Substantive Due Process

The suggestion that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments extended constitutional protection
beyond the procedural realm to substantive concerns relating to
a citizen's life, liberty and property interests came as a surprise
to members of the Supreme Court when the concept was first
articulated in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Calling
the argument a "strange misconception," the court rejected the
argument that the Due Process Clause could be used to challenge
7
the substantive merits of state laws . 0
In another case, Munn v. Illinois,7' the Court considered a
substantive due process argument directed at state-imposed maximum rates that warehouse owners could charge for grain storage. The owners contended that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from setting rates which
denied them the greater profit otherwise available in an unregulated free market.
The Supreme Court made short shrift of these arguments,
emphasizing the breadth of the police power, and the limits of
the due process guarantee."

Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878). The Court observed that:
[W]e are asked to hold that State Courts and State Legislatures have
deprived their citizens of ... property without due process of law. There
is abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the
scope of this provision ....
In fact, it would seem . . . that the clause
under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to . . . this
court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court
of the justice of the decision against him, and the merits of the legislation
on which such a decision may be founded.
Id. at 104. See also, Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519-520
(1885).
'- 94 U.S. 113 (1877). The importance of Munn v. Illinois in placing the rights of
property and the scope of the police power in perspective for the development of
twentieth century governance in the United States cannot be over-stated. Munn v. Illinois
was described by Professor (later Justice) Felix Frankfurter as "among the dozen most
important decisions in our constitutional law." F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WArrE, 83 (1937).
72 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 125. Said Chief Justice Waite:
Under these [police] powers the government regulates the conduct of its
citizens one toward another, and the manner in which each shall use his
own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the common
good ....
[W]e think it has never yet been successfully contended that
such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against
interference with private property.
70
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Flatly rejecting the grain warehouse owners' substantive due
process argument, the Court found no judicial remedy for their
concerns: "We know that this a power which may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
'
not to the courts.

73

Thus, at this point in the historical evolution of constitutional taking doctrine the parameters of the police power, the
due process clause and the just compensation/eminent domain
clause were clearly defined: just compensation was required to
be paid when property was physically taken or impacted by the
government; the due process clause had no substantive thrust;
and the police power was a broadly conceived tool to be used
by government to suppress undesirable activities and further
important public interests. The only governmental "taking" of
property which required compensation involved physical occupation and/or use by the state.
E.

Tangling of the Doctrinal Web: DistinctionsBetween Police
Power and Fifth Amendment Limits are Blurred

The doctrinal repose existing at the time of Munn was not
to last for long. Indeed, the dissent in that case74 set the tone
for a "torrent of criticism ' "' 7 and the eventual erosion of Munn's
clearly articulated principles of judicial non-intervention into the
sphere of legislative judgment regarding the proper exercise of
the police power.
Justice Field's dissent evinced the serious concern of many
that, by insulating police power initiatives from meaningful judicial review, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of liberty, property, and contract would be rendered meaningless:
The principle upon which the opinion of the Majority proceeds
is . . . subversive of the rights of private property, heretofore

71
14

Id at 134.

Id. at 136.

11C.

Marshall, A New Constitutional Amendment, 24 AM. L. REV. 908 at 909
(1891), also cited in C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, V.
2, 594 (1922).
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believed to be protected by constitutional guaranties against

legislative interference

....

76

The legislation in question is nothing less than a bold assertion
of absolute power by the State to control at its discretion the
property and business of the citizen .... 77

Critics of the time paraded horrors before the public, asserting that Munn was a significant departure from established
notions of individual rights of liberty and property vis-a-vis the
role of the state under the constitution.

Thus, the argument was that the life, liberty and property
(of individuals and corporations) were shielded from state intrusion by the due process clauses of the fifth and the fourteenth
amendments. An in-depth analysis of this substantive due process theory, which was nurtured and grew in an environment of
social and economic discord and dislocation 78 wrought by the
Industrial Revolution, is beyond the scope of this work. It is
appropriate, however, to observe the result evident in the Court's
best known substantive due process decision, Lochner v. New
York. 79

76 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 136. Dissenting in a similar case involving state
regulation decided several years later, Justice Field observed that Munn v. Illinois:
in its wide sweep, practically destroys all the guaranties of the Constitution
and of the common law ... for the protection of the rights of the railroad
companies. Of what avail is the constitutional provision that no State shall
deprive any person of his property except by due process of law, if the
State can, by fixing the compensation ... take from him all that is valuable
in the property?

It sanctions intermeddling with all business and pursuits and property in
the community, leaving the use and enjoyment of property . . . to the
discretion of the legislature.
Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 186-87 (1883).
" Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 148. See also, C. Marshall, A New Constitutional
Amendment, 24 A-m. L. REV. 908, 912 (1891).
11Why substantive due process became a tool of judicial review at the time has
been a subject of debate; many have examined its origins, See e.g. B. TwIss, LAWYERS
AND THE CoNSTITUTIoN: How LAiSsEz-FAncE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942);
Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REv. 125
(1956); A. MASON AND W. BEANY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SocEETY 227-35
(1968); A. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1969); L. BETH,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917 138-66 (1971); Nelson,
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon the styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513, 521-532 (1974).
71 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner by now is synonymous with the economic substantive due process analysis characterizing the Court's review of state exercise of police
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In discussing the limits of the police power, the Lochner
Court relied on principles rooted in the philosophy of Justice
Field and the critics of Munn v. Illinois.0

powers during the first three decades of this century. It has properly been observed,
however, that the so-called Lochner era was ushered in by the Court's decision in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578 (1897). That case invalidated a state law which
barred the performance of any act within Louisiana related to contracting for a certain
type of insurance on property held within the state--unless the insurer was a Louisiana
company. The Court held that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause by interfering with the liberty to contract for insurance. Id. at 592. Professor
Tribe suggests that it was Allgeyer rather than Lochner that opened "the floodgates of
substantive due process review." L. TRIBE, AMEmcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 434-435 (1st
ed. 1977).
Nevertheless, Lochner provides the best illustration of the Court's strict scrutiny of
legislative ends and means. In that case the Court reviewed a New York statute limiting
the working hours of bakers to sixty hours per week. The stated end sought to be
achieved by the legislation was protection of workers health and welfare; the Court
viewed this rationale skeptically. Finding that other state legislative approaches would
not similarly infringe upon the right to contract while still effectively reaching the same
end, the Court held that the legislative means was not a valid exercise of the police
power.
The source of the Court's substantive due process analysis can be traced to cases
otherwise upholding exercises of the police power. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), a case emphatically rejecting the contention that a liquor prohibition law was
violative of due process, the Court used language that eventually would evolve into the
intrusive standard of judicial review it used during the Lochner period; the substantive
reasonableness of a state law would be examined to determine if it "had no real or
substantial relation" to the protection of public health, safety and welfare and whether
it effected "a palpable invasion of rights secured" by the Constitution. 123 U.S. 27, 31
(1885). See also, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
Professor Tribe cautions that the "period is ordinarily described as 'the Lochner
Era,' but it should be so characterized only with great caution--and with the recognition
that 'Lochnerizing' has become so much an epithet that the very use of the label may
obscure attempts at understanding." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (2d
ed. 1988). Be that as it may, one cannot dispute that the period from the turn of the
century until the mid-nineteen thirties was a time when the Court used an intrusive
substantive due process analysis to assess the validity of state police power initiatives.
10See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56:
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise
of the police power by the State.... Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment
would have no efficacy and the legislatures of the States would have
unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of
legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of
the people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely
without foundation the claim might be. The claim of the police power
would be a mere pretext--become another and delusive name for the
supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional
restraint.
Ultimately the Court found that the purpose underlying the New York statute was not
to protect the public, nor the health of bakers; rather
The real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW

&

POLICY

[VOL. 5:473

It should be remembered that the standard of judicial review
applied to substantive due process claims during the Lochner
era was strict and intrusive . 8 Nearly two hundred state statutes
were declared invalid on substantive due process grounds during
the three decades in which the Lochner standard of judicial
8
review was extant.

2

Ultimately, however, this approach to judicial review fell
victim to its own excesses and changing national economic circumstances. Both internal inconsistency in the analytical structure supporting the Lochnerian due process perspective and
mounting external pressures during the Great Depression 3 pushed
the doctrine to the brink of collapse.84

between the master and his employees . . . in a private business.
Id. at 64.
81 Refusing to defer to the legislative judgment about the end and means of the
statute, the Court in Lochner observed that:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree
to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The
act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be
valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in
his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
Id. at 57-58.
Giving little weight to the legislative purpose for regulating the working hours of
bakers, the Court suggested that:
[i]t is unfortunately true that labor . . . may carry with it the seeds of
unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative
majorities? . . . No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living,
could escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in
limiting the hours of labor in all employments would be valid, although
such limitation might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support
himself and his family.
Id. at 59.
82 See e.g, L. TRmE, supra, note 78, at 567, n. 2 (2d ed. 1988), and authorities
cited therein. Tribe notes, however, that the majority of cases decided on substantive
due process grounds resulted in affirmance of the challenged enactment.
11 See, Id. at 574-581. See also, P. MuRPHY, Tm CONSTITUTION IN CRIsIs TIMEs
70-82, 99-110 (1972).
" A major premise of this article is that while substantive due process was observed
to have been interred by the Court's decisions of the mid and late 1930's such as Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), it has been resurrected in disguised form in the Court's modern "takings"
doctrine. See note 87 and accompanying text. See also, McGinley, Regulatory "Takings":
The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENvTL. L. RPTr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10369 (1987); and Lawrence,
Means, Motives and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 231 (1988).
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By 1937, the use of substantive due process analysis as a
vehicle for voiding police power legislation fell into disfavor.85
In a short time, the Lochner line of cases was explicitly rejected 6
and by the 1950's the Lochner substantive due process analysis
was history, the Court having returned to the deferential judicial
review of police power laws articulated with8 7clarity in Munn v.
Illinois more than seventy-five years earlier.
F.

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon and the Linkage of Substantive
Due Process and Taking Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era

By the early 1940's, the days of strict and intrusive judicial
scrutiny were gone. Police power enactments directed at the
protection of public interests were once again given deference
and the second guessing of legislative motives by judges bent on
protecting the economic freedom and property rights of individuals and corporations was over--or so it seemed.
Disguised in the rhetoric of Fifth Amendment eminent domain/just compensation doctrine, the substantive due process
approach slipped unnoticed into the Court's taking jurisprudence
in the post-Lochner period.
The vital link between Lochner style substantive due process
analysis and post-Lochner taking analysis was forged in 1922 in
Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal v.

1, As Professor Tribe has noted, "Lochner's decline proceeded even more rapidly
than had its late-nineteenth century ascent." L. TRIBE, supra note 78 at 581 (2d ed.
1988). Thus, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) the Court turned its
back on the substantive due process analysis that it had used only a year before to strike
down a minimum wage statute. In West Coast Hotel, the Court upheld another state
minimum wage enactment that was virtually indistinguishable from the one it had rejected
in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 581 (1936).
See e.g., Phelps Dodge v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177 (1941);
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535
(1949).
" Thus, in upholding a state statute whose rationality rested on a slim reed, the
Court bowed low to the alter of legislative power:
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases. But it is for the legislature, not the Courts, to balance the advantages
The day is gone when this
and disadvantages of the new requirement ....
Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they are unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. We emphasize
again what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. Illinois, . . . "For the
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
not to the courts."
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (citations omitted).
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Mahon Chief Justice Rhenquist recently stated that Pennsylvania
Coal " . . . for 55 years been the foundation of our regulatory
takings' jurisprudence.""s
Fertilized by Lochnerian substantive due process analysis
theory, the birth of so-called "regulatory taking" theory can be
traced to Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania Coal that " . ..
[tihe general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if it goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.'"19
Ignorant of Pennsylvania Coal's substantive due process heritage, regulatory taking cases during the last half-century have
struggled to identify the point at which a particular exercise of
the police power goes "too far" and thus must be "recognized
as a taking." As explained below, courts have unwittingly intertwined substantive due process analysis of Pennsylvania Coal
with eminent domain/just compensation doctrine. The result has
been judges' and scholars' inability to draw a bright line that
would assist in identifying an exercise of the police power which
has gone "too far". This floundering on the shoals of takings
analysis has led Justice Brennan to admit that: 90
[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. 91
Numerous theories have been developed by judges and scholars in an attempt to resolve the dilemma identified but not

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). By the term "regulatory taking" the Chief Justice referred
to the concept that government actions which do not involve a physical occupation of
real property, but which through the exercise of police power based regulation diminish
or destroy the value of private property, are considered to be compensable takings
entitled to Fifth Amendment "just compensation". See also, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,

319 (2d ed. 1986). The flawed
perspective that has led to the wide use of the term "regulatory taking" is discussed
below.
11Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. It is a regulatory taking that Congress
sought to avoid when it conditioned SMCRA prohibitions of mining on valid existing
rights.
. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
91Id. at 124.
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
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resolved by Holmes-"how far is too far?" '92 None of these
theories has provided a reliable answer. Not surprisingly, none
of these theories recognize the distinction between Substantive
Due Process Takings of the Pennsylvania Coal genre and Eminent Domain Takings. Recognition of this distinction is crucial
to an understanding of the development of taking jurisprudence.
G.

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon - A Case of Due Process
"Taking"

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon involved a challenge to a
Pennsylvania statute, known as the "Kohler Act", that prohibited the removal of coal by underground mine operators beneath
homes and other surface structures. Removal of such coal had
the effect of causing subsidence93 of the surface with attendant
serious damage to surface features.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Kohler Act
against a substantive due process challenge, finding that the
statute was a valid exercise of the police power directed at
regulating a business activity which harmed important public
interests. 94 A dissenting Pennsylvania Justice waved the rhetori-

92

Commentary on these issues is legion. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-

ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); N. BowIE, TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF DISTRIB-

UTIVE JUSTICE (1971); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A DecisionalModel
for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983); Humbach, A Unifying Theory for
the Just-CompensationCases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV.
243 (1982); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. REv. 149
(1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. REV. 30 (1964); Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).
91 Coal mine subsidence--the fracturing and caving of overlying rock strata and
the surface caused by the removal of underground coal--often results in substantial
structural damage to foundations, walls and supporting beams. It can cause sinkholes,
troughs and sloughing of surface land making it difficult or impossible to develop.
Farming activities can be impeded because areas that are subsided are difficult to plant
and plow; subsidence can cause the loss of ground water flowing to springs and wells
and dewater surface streams and lakes. As the Court observed in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 475 (1987): "[i]n short, it presents the type
of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local
regulation in recent decades." For further discussion of the impacts of coal mine
subsidence, see generally, Blazey and Strain, Deep Mine Subsidence-State Law and the
FederalResponse, I E. MIN. L. INST. 1-5 (1980). See also, F. Lee & J. Abel, Subsidence
from UndergroundMining: Environmental Analysis and Planning Considerations, U.S.
Geol. Sur. Circ. 876 (1983), 2-12.
" Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 118 At. 491 (1922), rev'd
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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cal flag of private property rights95 in language reminiscent of
Field's dissent in Munn v. Illinois6 and the arguments of the
proponents of substantive due process which had accumulated
over the almost two decades that had passed since the Lochner
decision.
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, held
that the Kohler Act abrogated valid contract rights and could
not be justified as a legislative attempt to protect public welfare
and safety:
This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a
public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase and
sale and in all that happens in the commonwealth. Some
existing rights may be modified even in such a case. But usually
in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant
much of this kind of interference. A source of damage to such
a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is
inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not
common or public. The extent of the public interest is shown
by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does
not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of
the coal. Furthermore it is not justified as a protection of
personal safety. That could be provided for by notice. Indeed
the very foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave
timely notice of its intent to mine under the house. On the
other hand the extent of the taking is great. It purports to
abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in
land--a very valuable estate-and what is declared by the
court below to be a contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs. If
we were called upon to deal with the plaintiff's position alone
we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a
public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction
97
of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights.

95 Mahon, 274 Pa. at 507, 118 At. at 497 (Kephart, J. dissenting).

Compare Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 136-154 (Field, J. dissenting) and Mahon,
274 Pa. at 507, 118 At. at 497-501 (Kephart, J. dissenting).
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-414 (citations omitted).
Apparently in response to the plea of the Pennsylvania coal industry that, if
enforced, the Kohler Act would result in mass economic dislocation in that state's coal
fields, the Supreme Court quickly accepted the appeal, heard oral arguments and
rendered an opinion nullifying the enactment as an invalid exercise of the police power.
Only five months passed from the entry of the Pennsylvania Court's order upholding the law until the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion invalidating it. It is
remarkable that an opinion that has had such a dramatic and far-reaching impact on
the development of an important issue of constitutional law was rendered less than one
month after oral argument.
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In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court held that (1) the statute was

not a valid exercise of the police power; and (2) impermissibly
interfered with private contractual relationships.98 The Court
recognized that both the constitution's contract clause" and the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provide protection
from inappropriate exercises of the police power:
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied
limitation must have its limits or the contracts and due process
clauses are gone.100
Importantly, Justice Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania
Coal, vigorously dissented from the substantive due process analysis of the Court in Lochner v. New York and subsequent
cases.' 0 1 Thus, his reference to substantive due process as the
basis for invalidating the police power regulation in Pennsylvania
Coal must be explained. 0 2

" Id. at 414. The court held that the Pennsylvania legislature had, in effect,
transferred ownership of the coal from its legitimate owners to surface owners like the
Mahons: "So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a
danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought." Id. at 416.
" The contracts clause is part of U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. ("No State shall . . .
pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . ").
1 260 U.S. at 413. The concept that a taking could be affected by violation of
the due process clause as well as by an exercise of eminent domain did not surface first
in Pennsylvania Coal. As observed below, such arguments had been made on a number
of occasions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and during the Lochner era.
In a case decided only a year before Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes clearly stated the view
that a deprivation of substantive due process could be a "taking":
All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control
are present. The only matter that seems to us open to debate is whether
the statute goes too far. For just as there comes a point at which the police
power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain, it may be conceded
that regulations of the present sort pressed to a certain height might amount
to a taking without due process of law.
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
10,In Lochner, Holmes wrote:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere
with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for
some . . . , is interfered with by school laws, by the post office, by every
state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought
desirable, whether he likes it or not. The 14th Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Lochner, 195 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
102 See supra, McGinley, note 83 at 10374-75.
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Given Holmes' strong disagreement with the Lochner intrusive judicial review model, Pennsylvania Coal is appropriately
viewed as an attempt to validate some residual protection of
property rights lodged in the due process clause; Holmes standard of judicial review, however, fell short of the substitution
of judicial opinion for legislative judgment which is recognized
as the hallmark of Lochnerian due process analysis. While Holmes
deemed the substantive due process analysis of Lochner far too
broad, when as in Pennsylvania Coal, (1) the justification for
exercise of the police power is invalid, and (2) the extent of the
impact on property rights is extreme (total diminution of value),
the due process clause required that "there must be an exercise
of eminent domain to sustain the act."'' 3 Otherwise, the regulatory taking would be struck down as a violation of the substantive due process guarantee."'
It is the substantive due process foundation of Pennsylvania
Coal that has escaped notice as the confusing post-Lochner
taking jurisprudence evolved. 0 5 The blurring of the fundamental
distinction between eminent domain and due process takings
spawned intrusive Lochnerian style judicial review.
IV.

UNTANGLING THE WEB: THE COURT'S KEYSTONE DECISION
CLARIFIES TAKINGS LAW AND PENNSYLVANIA

COAL

Sixty-five years after Pennsylvania Coal was decided, the
Court grappled with another taking case from the Pennsylvania
coal fields--Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis.'°6
The Court's opinion in the later case clarifies the Court's taking

,03
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
0' For a detailed discussion of this point, see McGinley, supra, note 83.
on this point, see Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings:
105 For commentary
The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Costal Commission, 12 HARv. ENVn. L. REV.
231 (1988); McGinley, Regulatory 'Takings': The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic
Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENV. L. RPTR. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10369 (1987); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REv.1057, 1097-99 (1980); Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings and Other Myths, 1
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 105 (1985); Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity Of
Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process As A Superior Alternative To Takings
Analysis, 57 U. WASH L. REV. 715 (1982). For cases which discuss this point, see Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Fred F. French
Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 85 N.Y.S. 205, 350 N.E.2d 381
(1976). See also, Williamson Planning Commn. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197200 (1985).
1- 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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jurisprudence, at least in so far as it distinguishes exercises of
the police power to abate public nuisances and noxious uses
from other non-nuisance land use regulation emanating from the
same power. Keystone also informs as to whether the prohibitions of mining in Section 522(e) of the SMCRA can be sustained
against a taking challenge. Keystone emphasizes what has been
obscured by the court's subsequent failure to analyze carefully
Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. In that seminal case,
Holmes did not mean to trigger strict judicial scrutiny of valid
police power enactments intended to abate nuisances and noxious
uses.
A.

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis

Recognizing the potentially "devastating effects" of subsidence, 10 7 in 1966 the Pennsylvania legislature concluded that the
Commonwealth's existing laws relating to coal mine subsidence
did not provide adequate protection for the public interest in
safety, land conservation, stability of tax base of municipalities
affected, and land development. On the basis of specific detailed
findings the General Assembly enacted 10 8the Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act.
The Subsidence Act empowers the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources to administer and enforce a comprehensive program to minimize or prevent subsidence and to
regulate its consequences.'°9 Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining
which would cause damage to certain structures, including homes,
public buildings, non-commercial buildings used by the public
and cemeteries. 10 Section 4 of the Act requires a coal company
to repair or pay for the repair of any structure damaged by
subsidence from its mining operation.
A cursory review of the Subsidence Act and the ends it seeks
to achieve leaves one with the impression that it is very much
like the Kohler Act which the Court invalidated in Pennsylvania
o Id.

at 474.

PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 1406.1 (Purdon Supp. 1990) ("the Subsidence Act.")
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476.

1o In 1980 the legislature amended the Subsidence Act in response to the enactment
of SMCRA and in an attempt to gain primary jurisdiction under Section 503 of SMCRA,
30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988). The amendment provided protection for additional classes of
structures and surface features including schools, hospitals, courthouses, perennial streams

certain large water impoundments and subsurface aquifers. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 89.145
(a) and 89.146 (b) (1983).
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Coal v. Mahon. Seizing on the facial similarity of the statutes,
the coal industry petitioners argued that the case was not materially different, on the facts and the law, from what Holmes
and his brethren had faced.
Indeed, both cases involved a Pennsylvania statute which the
state argued, had been enacted to protect important public interests; both statutes barred coal companies from removing coal
under homes and other surface structures to prevent subsidence
damage; in each situation the coal companies relied on exculpatory clauses in broad-form coal severance deeds"' to support
their claim of a right to mine coal without any liability for
subsidence damage; and in both cases coal companies claimed
that the statute would have a destructive effect on coal companies' ability to mine their reserves, thus effectively "taking"
' 2
their property without just compensation."

"I Such exculpatory clauses were common in deeds granting or reserving ownership
of coal severed from the fee simple estate. A typical example of such a clause includes:
The right to mine and remove all of said coal, and with the free and
uninterrupted right of way into, upon, over, and under the said lands, at
such points and in such manner, for such ways, tracks, and roads as may
be necessary and proper for the purpose of ventilating, draining, digging,
mining, operating, and carrying away said coal, or other coal or coke,
without any liability for damages that may arise from the removal of any
or all of said coal, or the manufacture of coke, without being required to
provide or leave support for the overlying strata or surface, and without
being liable for any injury to the same, or anything therein or thereon, or
to the streams or water courses thereof.
Continental Coal v. Connelsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 138 S.E. 737,
738 (1927).
Similar exculpatory clause waivers of liability for subsidence damage in Keystone
were obtained at the turn of the century. The court explained that "[n]o question of
enforcement of such a waiver against the original covenantor is presented; rather petitioners claim a right to enforce the waivers against subsequent owners of the surface."
Id. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 505, n. 32. Observing that Pennsylvania courts had held that
these waivers run with the land, the Court hinted that "Pennsylvania courts might have
had, or may have in the future have, a valid basis for refusing to enforce these perpetual
covenants against subsequent owners of the surface rights ....
".justification for
legislative impariment of contracts. Id.
112 As noted above, the gravamen of the coal companies' complaint in the earlier
case centered on constitutional due process and right to contract theories--calling on
the court to apply its then extant Lochnerian substantive due process standard of judicial
review; in Keystone the coal industry parties argued that the newer Pennsylvania law
abridged the eminent domain/just compensation clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments and the contract clause. The contract clause argument was reduced to its
essence by Justice Stevens: "[I]t is petitioners' position that, because they contracted
with some previous owners of property generations ago, they have a constitutionally
protected legal right to conduct their mining operations in a way that would make a
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To the coal company petitioners, Pennsylvania Coal was
clearly controlling: Keystone should have been little more than

a deja vu experience for the Court, 13' calling for a summary
reversal of the lower court decisions. The Supreme Court, however, chose to look farther than the superficial similarities be-

tween the two Pennsylvania coalfield takings cases. In an opinion
authored by Justice Stevens, the Court found that Pennsylvania
Coal "differs ... in critical and dispositive respects ... " from
4
Keystone.l'
The Court found that "Justice Holmes ... characteristically
'' 5
decided the specific case at hand in a single, terse paragraph 91
and then "uncharacteristically provided the parties with an ad6
visory opinion discussing the general validity of the Act."")1

shambles of ... buildings and cemeteries." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 505. Because the
focus of this discussion is the Court's taking jurisprudence, the Keystone court's rejection
of the companies' contract clause argument is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it
to say that the Court applied a non-Lochnerian standard of judicial review ("courts
should 'properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of
a particular measure') Id. Using this standard, the Court concluded that "the impairment of petitioners' right to enforce the damages waivers is amply justified by the public
purposes served by the Subsidence Act." Id. at 506. The coal companies had relied upon
waivers contained in coal severence deeds for their argument that the Subsidence Act
impaired pre-existing rights to subside lands without liability for damages.
"I Justice Stevens characterized this argument: "Petitioners assert that disposition
of their takings claim calls for no more than a straightforward application of the Court's
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 481.
- "Although there are some obvious similarities between the cases .. .the similarities are far less significant than the differences, and ... Pennsylvania Coal does not
control this case." Id. at 481. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, strongly
disagreed. See Id. at 507-510.
,,1
Id. at 483. See supra paragraph from Holmes' PennsylvaniaCoal opinion quoted
in text occompanying note 96.
"6 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484. While Chief Justice Rehnquist could not accept this
view, see id. at 508-509, the explicit language of Holmes' opinion leaves no room to
doubt the majority's observation:
But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the
act should be discussed. The Attorney General of the State, and the
representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the
argument below and have submitted their contentions here. It seems,
therefore, to be our duty to go farther in the statement of our opinion, in
order that it may be known at once, and that further suits should not be
brought vain.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
Of course the necessity for "going farther in the statement of our opinion" was
necessitated by the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of a single home who, relying
on the Kohler Act, had sought to enjoin the coal company's undermining of his dwelling.
There were no other parties plaintiff.
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The Keystone Court emphasized that in Pennsylvania Coal,
the statute " . . . merely involve[d] a balancing of the private
economic interests of coal companies against the private economic interests of surface owners.""' 7 The Subsidence Act, in
contrast, was found by the District Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court to set forth legislative purposes to advance important public interests which were "genuine, substantial, and legitimate."" 8 "None of the indicia of a statute enacted
solely for the benefit of private parties identified in Holmes'
opinion are present here." 119
B.

Keystone: The "Special Status" of Police Power Initiatives
Which Abate Public Nuisances and Noxious Uses and Its
Application to Section 522(e) of the SMCRA

The portion of the Keystone opinion which bears directly,
and in my view, dispositively, on the issue of the validity of
Section 522(e) of the SMCRA addresses the relationship between

Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 413-415.
"I Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486. Section 2 of the Subsidence Act provides in relevant
part:
This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the
Commonwealth for the protection of the health safety and general welfare
of the people of the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of
surface land areas which may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal
by methods other than the "open pit" or "strip" mining, to aid in the
protection of the safety of the public, to enhance the value of such lands
for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water drainage and public
water supplies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such
lands ...
17

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1990).

- Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486. Justice Stevens observed that Holmes found that the
Kohler Act "was a 'private benefit' statute since it 'ordinarily does not apply to land
when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal."' The safety justification for the
Kohler Act likewise was insupportable because safety of overlying landowners could
easily have been accomplished through a notice requirement; the Subsidence Act, in
contrast, was designed to advance a wide variety of public interests rather than focusing
on safety as the legislative drafters of the Kohler Act had done. Id. Finally, Stevens
noted that Section 6 of the Subsidence Act (which requires coal operators to pay for
subsidence damage notwithstanding waivers of liability contained in operator's coal
severance deeds) was not rendered unnecessary because the state administers an insurance
program to reimburse surface owners for the cost of repair of their properties. This
argument, said Justice Stevens, mistakenly assumes that the law was "motivated by a
desire to protect private parties." Section 6's requirement that operators repair "deters
the operator from causing the damage at all--the Commonwealth's main goal--whereas
an insurance program would merely reimburse . . . after the damage occurs." Id at 487.
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police power laws whose purpose is to suppress public nuisancetype activity and non-nuisance regulation. In its discussion of
this relationship the Court emphasized that, to Holmes, "a
critical factor" in determining if there had been a taking in20
Pennsylvania Coal was the nature of the state interest involved.1
Thus, as mentioned above, the fact that the Kohler Act
benefited private parties rather than advancing important public
interests invalidated the attempted exercise of the police power. 12'
Emphasizing the nuisance character of the mining activity that
the newer Subsidence Act prohibits, the Keystone Court discussed the broad power of legislative bodies to protect the public
122
from similar nuisance activities.
In an extremely important clarification of Pennsylvania Coal,
the Keystone court observed that Justice Holmes did not dispute
Justice Brandeis' argument in dissent--that "the state has an
absolute right to prohibit land use that amounts to a public
nuisance.' 1 23 Reaching back more than a century to the opinion
in Mugler v. Kansas, Justice Stevens explained that exercises of
the police power to repress public nuisances have been "repeatedly upheld", even "regulations that destroy or adversely affect
24
real property interests." 1
Rejecting the coal industry's implicit assertion that Mugler
and its progeny were tacitly overruled by Pennsylvania Coal, the
Keystone majority quoted extensively from Mugler's clear and
unequivocal distinction between valid exercises of the police
power to prevent or abate public nuisances and police power
125
regulatory initiatives that seek to accomplish other objectives:
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488.
Id. Obviously, if the police power is that implied power of sovereignty whose
exercise seeks to advance public health, morals, safety and the general welfare, a law
which protects only private interests would be ultra vires.
122 Id.
'2 Id. at n. 17. Justice Stevens observed that the point of disagreement between
the two Justices was whether the Kohler Act was a legislative attempt to abate public
nuisance-like activities; Holmes concluded that it was not. Id. See also Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S.
at 417.
,2 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488, n.18. (citations omitted). The court discusses Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), a case that upheld as a valid police power exercise
Kansas' prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, even though
the prohibition diminished the value of a pre-existing brewery. See also Keystone, 480
U.S. at 489.
2 An example of the latter would be zoning which, while grounded firmly in the
police power, does not need the excuse of nuisance abatement to legitimize regulations
of land use. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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[Pirohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any
just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of property
....The power which the states have of prohibiting such use
by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the
health morals, or the safety of the public, is not--and consistently with the existence of organized society cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain,
by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of
26
their property, to inflict injury upon the community.
Mindful of Justice Holmes' observations concerning the connection between diminution of value occasioned by police power
regulation and an unconstitutional taking, Keystone also admonished that the extent of the diminution is " . . . by no means

conclusive.' '2 7 Moreover, relying on Mugler's extremely broad
view of the scope of the police power to regulate nuisances,
Justice Stevens reminded that all private property "is held under
the implied obligation that the owners' use of it shall not be
injurious to the community ....,,128 Juxtaposing this sweeping
view of the police power with the restricting force of the just
compensation/eminent domain clause, the Court opined that
"[T]he Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one
that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power
''
to enforce it. 129
The Keystone Court separated police power regulation of
nuisance activity and noxious uses from other exercises of legislative power such as zoning which are also intended to further
the public interest. Indeed, the court signaled that such regulatory efforts are afforded "special status" in takings analysis:
The special status of this type of state action can be understood
on the simple theory that since no individual has the right to

1 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 489, quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-669, and citing
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); and Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
"I Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490, citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962).
,z Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492 quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665, and citing Beer Co.
v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
I" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492, again relying on Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664.
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use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm
others, the state has not "taken" anything when it asserts its
power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity. 30

To the extent that Section 522(e) of SMCRA seeks to abate
coal mining nuisances and noxious mining uses of land, it is
entitled to the deference afforded the special status of such
legislative action.
C.

Keystone's Alternative Rationale for Sustaining the
Subsidence Act

The Keystone Court did not rely exclusively on the nuisance
abatement goal to sustain the Pennslyvania subsidence law. Keystone's other justifications for upholding the Act deserve attention. 3'
Keystone recognized that two considerations of Holmes'

opinion in the Pennsylvania Coal case have become, "integral
parts"

of the Court's general takings analysis. 3 2 Those two

factors--whether (1) a land use regulation "substantially ad-

'" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491, n. 20, citing Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 155-161 (1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1165, 1235-37 (1967).
While Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other dissenters,
believed that the Subsidence Act focused "on essentially economic concerns" (Keystone,
480 U.S. at 513) rather than nuisance abatement and thus did not deserve to be
"excepted" from constitutional takings proscriptions, he did admit that if the law was
a valid "nuisance statute" it would be entitled to substantial deference during judicial
review. Id. at 511, n. 3. The Chief Justice's view of what he calls "the nuisance
exception" is virtually identical with that espoused by the Keystone majority:
[W]e have recognized that a taking does not occur where the government
exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using
his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of
the forbidden use.
Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). Interestingly, the dissent cited Mugler, among
others, as authority for this proposition. The dissent also observed that "our cases have
never applied the nuisance exception to allow a complete extinction of the value of a
parcel of property." Id. at 511, n. 3. This observation, as discussed infra at note 167,
is not supported either by logic or the cases upon which the Chief Justice purports to
rely.
,3, The Keystone majority did not have to go any further in sustaining the Subsidence Act than to rely on the Mugler nuisance abatement rationale. However, because
of the confusion emanating from a half-century of mis-reading Pennsylvania Coal and
the close split of the court in Keystone, it made sense to further bolster the opinion by
showing that application of taking analysis to non-nuisance legislative measures would
similarly result in the validation of the Subsidence Act.
132 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
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vances legitimate state interests or (2) denies an owner economically viable use of his land," -- are tests used to determine
'
whether a compensable taking has occurred. 33
In Keystone, unlike Pennsylvania Coal, the coal industry
34
parties failed to satisfy their burden with regard to both tests.
First, as noted above, the Subsidence Act furthers substantial
public interests.' 3 5 Second, the later statute did not "make the
mining of coal commercially impracticable;" in making a facial
challenge, the "petitioners have never claimed that their mining
operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable
since the Subsidence Act was passed.'

'3 6

The application of these "tests" has relevance to "regulatory
taking" determinations regarding Section 522(e) of the SMCRA,
and will be addressed below in the context of a specific discussion of the significance of Keystone to SMCRA's "prohibitions
by Act of Congress. ' ' 37 In addition, the other cumulative lessons
of a century of Supreme Court due process and eminent domain/
just compensation taking cases will be applied as well.

"I See e.g. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
11 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
'35 Id. at 492.
316Id. at 495-96. In order to circumvent the serious problem of lack of proof of
the extent of diminution of value of their coal, the petitioners attempted to narrow the
scope of the property interest to which the taking analysis would apply--as the Court
put it "[tihey advance two alternative ways of carving their property" in order to reach
the conclusion that they had been deprived of all the economic use of their property.
Id.
They first argued that the tons of coal that would be left in the grouted if the
Subsidence Act were enforced was effectively appropriated or "taken", because the coal
left in place had no other useful purpose. The other contention was that the state had
effectively taken an interest in real property recognized only by Pennsylvania law--the
"support estate". Id., 496-97. The support estate is a legal term of art used only in
Pennsylvania. It refers to the common law right of subjacent support which Pennsylvania
courts have deemed to be a third discrete interest in real property separate from the
surface and mineral estates recognized by all other jurisdictions. For a discussion of the
parameters of the "support estate" see Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043
(1917), and see generally, Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent
Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMPLE L. Q. 1 (1951). With
regard to both arguments, the Court found that the facial attack was unsupported by
probative evidence in the record as to the effect of the statute on their ability to conduct
business profitably. Said the Court with not a small touch of irony: "Petitioners may
continue to mine coal profitably even if they may not destroy or damage surface
structures at will in the process." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501.
13' See infra, discussion in text accompanying note 151.
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VII.

SECTION

522(E)

PROHIBITIONS OF MINING: TAKING OR

VALID NON-COMPENSABLE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER?

The legislative history of the SMCRA indicates that "[T]he
decision to bar surface mining in certain circumstances is better
made by Congress itself. ' 138 Thus, in Section 522(e) of that Act,
certain areas were identified and placed off-limits to mining
activities. 13 9 Those areas include, both public and private lands.140
As explained below, these prohibitions are readily sustainable
with regard to the protected private lands and may withstand a
taking challenge regarding most, if not all, of the identified
federal lands as well.

H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
& ADMiN. NEWS 593, 631.
119SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988), contains certain narrow exceptions
to the congressional ban (in addition to the limitations imposed by the words "subject
to valid existing rights"). Subsection (e)(2) allows coal mining in a national forest "if
the Secretary finds that there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or other
values which may be incompatible with such surface mining operations" and that
"surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground coal mine." Mining is
also permitted within National Forests lands west of the 100th meridian which do not
have significant forest cover; such surface mining must comply with the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §
528 (1988)), the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377,
90 Stat. 1083 (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 181 note and scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.),
the National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 472a and scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.), and SMCRA. Subsection
(e)(3) of 522 allows mining even though it will adversely affect a public park or places
included in the National Register of Historic Sites if approved jointly by the regulatory
authority and the Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction over the park or
historic site.
Subsection (e)(4) allows mining within one hundred feet of any public road, where
mine access roads or haulage roads join such road. Also the regulatory authority may
permit such roads to be relocated or the area affected to lie within one hundred feet of
such road, if, after public notice and opportunity for public hearing in the locality, a
written finding is made that the interests of the public and the landowners affected
thereby will be protected.
Subsection (e)(5) allows mining within three hundred feet of any occupied dwelling,
if the homeowner waives the prohibition.
SMCRA §§ 522(e)(1) and (2), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272 (e)(1) and (2) (1988), protects
federal lands included in the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge
Systems, the National System of Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System,
the Wild and Scenic Rivers System (including study rivers), National Recreation Areas,
and National Forests.
Sections 522(e)(3)-(5) protects non-federal public and private lands including publicly owned parks, places included in the National Register of Historic Sites, within one
hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public road, within three hundred
feet from any occupied dwelling, public building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
13,

CONG.
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Section 522(e) is Sustainable As A Legislative Prohibition
of Noxious Use/Nuisance Activity

As suggested above, the potential adverse impacts of mining
on these important and/or sensitive areas was so apparent that
Congress concluded that there was no reason to leave the designation of such areas to the discretion of a regulatory agency. 14'
In the case of each area to which Section 522(e) is applicable,
common sense dictates that coal mining activities would be as
much of a nuisance as Justice Sutherland's graphic reference to
42
the unsuitability of a pig in the parlor instead of a barnyard:
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid . .. a

particular use, like the question whether a particular thing is
a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or the thing considered apart, but by
considering it in connection with the circumstances and locality. A nuisance may merely be a right thing in the wrong
43
place,--like a pig in a parlor instead of a barnyard.
Therefore, while coal mining may be perfectly appropriate high
on an unpopulated eastern Kentucky ridge, most reasonable and
objective people would deem it a noxious or nuisance activity
when conducted within 100 feet of a cemetery, or 300 feet of a
school, hospital, public park or road; so too would they find
mining activities with attendant blasting, operation of heavy
equipment and coal haulage trucks, subsidence, noise, dust and
similar characteristic effects of coal mining to be repugnant
nuisances within the boundaries of such federal lands as National
Wildlife Refuges, National Parks, Wild and Scenic Rivers that

141 SMCRA § 522(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3) (1988), gives OSM and state regulatory agencies the power to designate land as unsuitable for mining in response to a
citizens petition or on their own motion.
,42
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
"4 Id. (citations omitted). In Euclid, the Court rejected a taking challenge and
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, the type of zoning ordinance which
typically prohibits certain non-nuisance activities on private land. Euclid's discussion of
nuisance law informed the court's decision as to the permissible scope of the police
power; it also helps to explain the statements in Keystone that the "nuisance exception"
is not "coterminous with the police power." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting). That is, the police power encompasses not only the suppression of nuisance
activity, but the regulation of non-nuisance activities that interfere with a comprehensive
legislative plan of land use in a community. Other types of regulation of business and
property to protect public health, safety, morals and the general welfare fall within the
purview of the police power as well.

1989-901

PIGS AND PARLORS

are protected by Section 522(e)--"merely a right thing in a
wrong place" as Justice Sutherland would "say.)4
As indicated above, even the dissenters in Keystone recognized the general applicability of what they called "the nuisance
45
exception."
[W]e have recognized that a taking does not occur where the
government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a
property owner from using his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use.'4
The dissent found that the Subsidence Act was not the type
of police power regulation that the Court had previously held
to fall within the nuisance exception to takings analysis. 147 This
criticism of the statute was grounded in substantial measure on
48
the view that it was "much more than a nuisance statute."'1
Thus, the purposes of the Subsidence Act, though including
public safety, reflects a concern for preservation of buildings,
economic development, and the maintenance of property values

I" Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. One will recall the great deference accorded legislative
determinations to use the police power to suppress noxious and nuisance activities in
cases from Mugler v. Kansas to Keystone. The words of Justice Stevens in the latter
case are indicative and bear repeating:
since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance
or otherwise harm others, the state has not "taken" anything when it
asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491, n. 20.
41 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512. With all respect, the police power is not an exception
to the protection afforded by the just compensation/eminent domain and due process
clauses; rather the latter are exceptions to, or more appropriately limitations upon, the
application of the police power.
Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
Id. The dissent characterized this so-called exception to the "taking guarantee"
I'
as a "narrow exception allowing the government to prevent 'a misuse or illegal use'."
Id at 512. Such a characterization, however, affirms by negative implication that a
legislative exercise of the police power which recognizes certain activity (like coal mining)
to be an illegal nuisance when carried on in a certain place (such as within 300 feet of
a school or within the boundaries of a National Park) is a valid exercise of the power
which cannot be considered a taking.
I" Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). This interesting observation cuts substantially against the grain of the dissents' argument, for it suggests that if a statute like
the Subsidence Act really can be said to be "more than a nuisance statute," this defect
could be simply remedied by eliminating from its ameliorative goals all but the suppression of subsidence-caused damage--clearly as much a nuisance as damage caused by
blasting in the course of mining activities. Of course, the dissent fails to explain why a
statute which not only seeks to abate noxious uses, but also to accomplish other ends
well within the scope of the police power, could be any less viable than a law limited
exclusively to nuisance regulation.
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to support the State's tax base. 49 Without explanation, the dissent attempted to draw a distinction between the statute before
the Court and those entitled to be recognized as "nuisance
exceptions to the taking guarantee":150
We should hesitate to allow a regulation based on essentially
economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the
Fifth Amendment by labeling it a nuisance regulation.'
Notwithstanding the Keystone dissent's objections to characterization of the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act as a nuisance
statute, it seems clear that Section 522(e) does not suffer from
similar disabilities. That section clearly looks, in the words of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "to prevent a property owner from
using his property to injure others.' ' 2 As Justice Sutherland
observed in Euclid, "the question of whether a particular thing
is a nuisance," depends upon "the circumstances and the locality. ''

3

With regard to each area protected by Section 522(e)'s prohibitions, coal mining clearly is inappropriate. Few industrial
enterprises exhibit such a combination of nuisance activities that
threaten to annoy, injure, and damage than those attendant coal
mining.
B.

Prohibition of Mining on Private Lands

Congress decided that certain private lands deserved the absolute protection from the noxious effects of coal mining oper-

"IId. The dissenters take the odd position that nuisance law reaches only to the
protection of public safety, thus ignoring centuries of statutory and case law that
recognizes the power of courts and legislatures to abate activities that do not threaten
public safety, but which nevertheless substantially and unreasonably interfere with rights
common to the public. To appreciate how far the dissenters' observation departs from
long accepted nuisance doctrine, one need only recall the statute upheld by the Court in
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) which declared the possession of a certain kind
of fishing net to be a public nuisance--hardly an attempt to protect public safety.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512.
at 513.
"Id.
Id. at 511. Of course some might quibble with this observation, arguing that
Is
coal mining in areas designated by SMCRA § 522(e) will not injure anyone. Such
arguments would improperly limit the scope of injuries caused by nuisance, contrary to
well-established statutory and common law principles and ignore the very real potential
for physical injury and property damage occasioned by coal trucks, blasting, fugitive
dust, mine drainage, subsidence and other mining related harms.
11 Euclid, 272 U.S.
at 388.
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ations afforded by an out-right ban. The private lands protected
include publicly owned parks and places included in the National
Register of Historic Sites; mining is also prohibited within one
hundred feet of any public road or cemetery and, within three
hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, public building, school,
54
church, community, or institutional building, public park.,
Suffice it to say that Section 522(e)(3) through (5) exhibits
none of the indicia of a taking that have been identified in the
Supreme Court regulatory takings cases. That Section 522(e)
seeks to prevent nuisances and noxious uses cannot be doubted;
indeed mining activities within a few hundred feet of any buildings or places regularly used or inhabited by people would appear
a classic example of a nuisance.
The buffer zone-type regulation of coal mining activities
occasioned by Section 522(e)'s private land restrictions is fully
sustainable as a valid exercise of the police power.'
It cannot
rationally be viewed as "loading on one individual more than
his share of the burdens of government"--the core constitutional concern distilled by Chief Justice Rehnquist as the essence
15 6
of the Fifth Amendment's taking protection.

1 SMCRA §§ 522(e)(3)-(5), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272 (e)(3)-(5) (1988). The coal industry
has resisted the enforcement of this buffer zone concept. In all candor, one must
speculate as to the collective judgment of an industry that so seeks to maximize its
profits that it resists government attempts merely to provide a marginal buffer zone to
insulate the public from the obvious harms accompanying mining. One wonders whether
the economics of the coal mining business are so problematic that mining companies
will be cast into the throes of bankruptcy if they cannot mine to the foundation of a
school or church. Would those in the industry who have argued strenuously for a decade
that such buffer zones represent an invalid exercise of the police power, be willing to
accept a less restrictive limitation-say the ban of mining within 50 or 25 or perhaps 5
feet from a cemetery or the door of a hospital?
"I The court emphasized Justice Brandeis' observation (which was not contested
by Holmes) that the state has an absolute right to prohibit land use that amounts to a
public nuisance. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488, n. 17, citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S.
413-414.
516 Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 512. Takings challenges to SMCRA §§ 522(e)(3)-(5)
prohibitions will, in my view, be summarily rejected on noxious use/nuisance suppression
grounds alone. It is worth observing, however, that if one applies taking analysis
appropriate for non-nuisance land use regulation-that is diminution of value and
interference with distinct investment backed expectations-a similar result would obtain.
One need only look to Keystone for a concise articulation of why this is so:
Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make
profitable use of some segments of his property. A requirement that a
building occupy no more than a specified percentage of the lot on which
it is located could be characterized as a taking of the vacant area as readily
as the requirement that coal pillars be left in place. Similarly, under
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Prohibition of Mining on Federal Lands

Section 522(e)(1) is a per se prohibition1 7 of mining on
various important and environmentally sensitive federal lands,
including National Parks, National Wildlife Refuges and the
like.'" 8 Section 522(e)(2) bars strip mining in National Forests,
but allows underground mining in certain circumstances.5 9
Somewhat different issues arise when coal mining is barred
on federal as opposed to private lands. The Section 522(e) ban
is most easily upheld when a coal operator/owner holds a fee
simple interest. In this context, the accepted rule is that-when
land is not physically occupied and used by the government,
and, where the right of possession, use, and some economic or
other benefit remains in the owner--there has been no taking.160
Thus, for the owner of a fee simple located within the
boundaries of a protected federal area, the prohibition of coal

petitioners' theory one could always argue that a set-back ordinance requiring that no structure be built within a certain distance from the property
line constitutes a taking because the footage represents a distinct segment
of property for takings law purposes. Cf. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603
(1927) (upholding validity of set-back ordinance) (Sutherland, J.).
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498.
Justice Stevens rejected the coal petitioners' assertion that such regulation in the
Subsidence Act (requiring the coal operator to leave a pillar of coal beneath homes)
effected a taking. Said Stevens:
When the coal that must remain in the ground is viewed in the context of
any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financialbacked expectations, it is plain that the petitioners have not come close to
satisfying their burden of proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that property.
Id. at 499.
Similarly, coal operators who pose a takings challenge to the buffer zone restrictions
of SMCRA §§ 522(e)(3)-(5) will, no doubt, be doomed to the same fate as the Keystone
petitioners.
"I As the discussion above demonstrates, each and every prohibition of mining
contained in SMCRA § 522(e) is made "subject to valid existing fights." See supra,
discussion at note 138.
Is For a listing of all federal lands included within this per se ban, see supra, note
139.
", See supra, note 139.
160See e.g. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-499, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-68;
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Twin City Power
Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Compare
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1926), and United States v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 264 (1961). See also, Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV.
L. Rav. 1165, 1230-1233 (1967).
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mining on and under such lands would affect only one "strand
in the total bundle" of property rights incident to fee ownership.
The court in Andrus v. Allard 6' explained this rule:
Suffice it to say that government regulation--by definitioninvolves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often
this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property. To require compensation in
all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase .... [T]he denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At
least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property
rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not 6a2
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.
The Court has time and again rejected taking arguments
where only one use of property is prohibited, and/or the value
of the whole is diminished but not extinguished. 16 Given this
fact, one can predict with a high level of confidence that a
Section 522(e) (1) or (2) ban on mining will withstand constitutional taking scrutiny where the coal owner owns the fee, can
still exclude othersM and use the land for any other lawful
purpose.
1.

The Single Use Anomaly

A problem arises when mining is barred under Section 522(e)
and the mine operator owns only the mineral interest that has
been severed from the fee estate. 165 Such segmented ownership
of coal rights is common, although in the eastern coal fields it
is the product of contractual agreements between private parties,
while with regard to western federal lands the mineral estate

16.

444 U.S. 51, 65-66.

,62 Id. at 65-66. In the context of a Section 522(e) ban, the right deprived is to
mine coal for profit. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131; and Keystone, 480
U.S. at 496-97. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592-599 (2d
ed. 1988).
,63 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-127, and cases cited therein.
I6"This right to exclude others is a very important "strand" in the bundle of real
property rights; Justice Brandeis found that:
erty is the legal right to exclude others from
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
,65 Such severance may occur either by

"[a]n essential element of individual propenjoying it." International News Service v.
(dissenting opinion). See Kaiser Aetna v.
grant or reservation.
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may be owned or leased as a result of a transaction in which
the government itself is a party. 166
Where a coal owner possesses only the coal and the right to
mine it, the situation smacks of the often quoted concern expressed by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal:
'[f]or practical purposes the right to coal consists of the right
to mine it.' What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that
it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect
for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. 167

While many have done so in the past, one should not, upon
reading this portion of Holmes opinion in Pennsylvania Coal,
jump immediately to the conclusion that the total diminution of
value of a property interest necessarily begets a taking.1 68 On the
contrary, such a conclusion, while superficially appealing, flies

When the government is a party to the transaction, different concerns must be
addressed. Perhaps the best argument the coal owner has to invalidate a SMCRA §
522(e) ban on federal lands would be based on contract clause principles rather than
taking doctrine. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 505, where the court emphasized that while
a state may interfere with contracts between private parties to protect important public
interests, courts should not necessarily defer to legislative judgment where "the State
itself is a contracting party." See also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power
and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 (1983); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 23 (1977).
167Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15 (citations omitted).
I" Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that "though nuisance regulations have been
16

sustained despite a substantial reduction in value, we have not accepted the proposition
that the state may completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without
providing compensation." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513. Thus, the Chief Justice suggests
that in Mugler the prohibition on manufacture and sale of liquor made a brewery "of
little value" but "did not completely extinguish the value of the building." Id. He drew
a similar distinction regarding Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cedar trees caused
to be cut to preserve neighboring apple orchards from blight could still be used). Id.
The two other cases the Chief Justice relied on involve non-nuisance regulation: (Penn
Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)(restrictions on use of historic building) and, Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)(safety ordinance without effect on tract value). In
contrast to his views, the Keystone majority stated that "the Court has repeatedly upheld
regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property interests." Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 488, n. 18 (citing cases). While the Keystone dissent's point might be technically
correct regarding cases like Mugler and Miller, the conclusion implicitly drawn--that
the total extinction of all value in certain property is a taking--misses the mark by a
wide margin. Indeed, the fact that the suppression of noxious uses and nuisances may
leave some de minimus value in affected property is clearly irrelevant to the Court's
holdings in such cases. It seems an extreme view to suggest that the Court would have
found a taking in Mugler if the value of the building had been reduced to zero, or in
Miller if the state had ordered the cedar trees burned, instead of allowing the owner to
salvage them.
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in the face of the teaching of the Court's noxious use/nuisance
cases from Mugler to Keystone. The lesson of those cases is that
the diminution of property value occasioned by governmental
69
attempts to suppress a nuisance or noxious use is irrelevant;
only where government regulation destroys property values attendant an otherwise "innocent use" of land should diminution
be considered. 70 Professor Tribe argues that even total diminution of value does not signal a taking, where nuisances and
noxious uses are involved:
in accord with ordinary intuition, government need not pay
even for complete takeover or destruction if the latter is justified by the owner's insistence on using his property to injure
other people or their property. In such cases of noxious use,
or nuisance, the offending user may be required to stop, and
if he refuses his property may be seized as a means of enforcing
civility.",
Other reasons also militate in favor of upholding a Section
522(e) ban even where the totality of the property owned is the
coal seam and the right to mine it. For example, if mining a
coal seam will produce sulfuric acid mine drainage and the
operators' cost of treatment of the discharge before it enters a
stream would be economically prohibitive, mining operations
can be prohibited. A regulation prohibiting the discharge of
untreated acid mine drainage would not effect a taking--even
though the coal operator owned only the coal and the regulation,
to paraphrase Holmes, made it commercially impracticable to
mine it.172

69

Diminution of value is a relevant factor in the substantive due process standard

of judicial review appropriate to "due process takings". Cf. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 331-333 (1981).
10 Professor Tribe has succinctly stated the distinction between noxious/nuisance
uses and "innocent uses" that suffer a diminution of value as a result of zoning or
other land use regulation. That is, there is nothing innately noxious or offensive about
an apartment house, but it may be totally prohibited from an area reserved by a zoning
ordinance for single family dwellings. Thus, Tribe concluded that:
It is this "non-noxious" or innocent use qualification that came to cause
the greatest difficulty as the law of takings and of just compensation
developed.

L.TRIBE, AMiucAN
''
'

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

593-594 (2d ed. 1988).

Id. at 593.
See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
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Simply put, the reason such a regulation would not be con-

73
of
sidered a taking lies in recognition of the "special status"'

police power initiatives directed at suppressing nuisance/noxious
uses. That is precisely why Holmes' statements about "diminution of value" regulations which make it "commercially impractical" to mine coal are relevant only in cases like Pennsylvania
Coal. There, Holmes found "the statute does not disclose a
public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of
74
. . constitutionally protected rights."
The legislation was not
an attempt to abate a public nuisance but rather redistributed
economic benefits between private parties.
Moreover, one is struck by the anomaly if a taking is found
to occur where the total value of a severed property interest is
extinguished by a regulation of noxious/nuisance characteristics
of mining activities. In such cases the strange, and in my view
unacceptable, result is that one who owns less property, is en75
titled to more constitutional protection.
As noted above, when land is held in fee, the prohibition of
"the most beneficial use of the property" does not constitute a
taking, where the owner maintains the right to use the property
for other uses. 76 Where, by contrast, only the coal is owned,
the argument is that all the value has been extinguished by the
regulatory prohibition of a single use--coal mining. Thus, so
the theory goes, the owner of the single-use severed mineral
*

interest receives "just compensation"

for a regulatory taking;

however, she would receive nothing if she owned the fee estate.
Utilizing the single-use taking argument one can easily envision the following scenario in the context of a Section 522(e)
prohibition of mining on federal lands. A fee owner could sell
the surface and retain the minerals. This simple maneuver would
assure compensation because mining would be prohibited and
the coal owner would possess mineral rights devoid of economic
value.
There are, moreover, no legal impediments to a coal owner's
sale of that portion of her coal property lying outside a protected

,71
See note 130, supra and accompanying text where the Keystone majority recognizes this "special status."
,14Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
1'5 See McGinley and Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is
the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 U. TULSA L. REV. 418, 438-439 (1981).
76 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
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federal area. This would insure that the value of her property
lying within the boundary of the federal land unit would be
reduced to zero. The single-use taking theory would require
compensation, although if she had not sold her adjoining holding
she could have mined the tract profitably notwithstanding the
fact that the area within the federal unit could not be disturbed.
A third possibility involves speculative purchase of Section
522(e)(1) or (2) lands. One could purchase the severed coal estate
with the design of collecting "just compensation" for a singleuse regulatory taking.'"1

These examples of the application of the single-use taking
theory reveal a fundamental defect. Individuals and corporations
would be allowed unrestrained freedom to align real property
interests by private contract in ways that defeat legitimate legislative efforts to suppress noxious uses and nuisances. In the
process, by private contract, these parties create greater constitutional protection 7

2.

8

for themselves.

The Single Use Theory In Perspective

A similar concern was expressed by the Court in Penn Central even though the regulation in question was of a non-noxious
"innocent use.' ' 7 9 The owners of Grand Central Station, a
building designated a landmark, objected to a New York City
ordinance's prohibition of their right to alter the historic station
by constructing a high rise office building on top of it. Claiming
that a segmented property interest protected by state law--air
rights--had been totally extinguished by the regulation, they

171 Such a scenario suggests the wisdom of OSM's current valid existing rights test
which cuts off the right to mine in Section 522(e) areas if the coal owner did not apply
for all applicable permits relating to the mining by the date of enactment of the SMCRA,
August 3, 1977. See 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(l)-(2) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (1979), as
modified by In Re Permanent Surface Mining Litig. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083,
1091 (D. D.C. 1980) (mem). The "all permits" test removes the incentive to speculate
on the availability of compensation for a taking of land within areas protected by Section
522(e).
"I' That is, the property owner is compensated in the form of a payment for the
devalued segmented property interest.
I" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138-139 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Said the
dissent: "Only in the most superficial sense ... can this case be said to involve 'zoning."'
Id. And explaining Curtin v Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911), a case in which the court
found a taking, the dissent offered: "The prohibition in question, however, was not a
prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the prevention of a legal and essential use, an
attribute of ownership." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145.
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argued that it had effected a taking without just compensation.
Said the Court in response:
[T]he submission that appellants may establish a "taking"
simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to
exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed
was available for development is quite simply untenable....
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether80 rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
Of course, one might attempt, to distinguish Penn Central
on the ground that there was not a severance of air rights from
the fee; rather the property owner argued that the diminution
of value of the air rights should be isolated for takings analysis
purposes. This would be a distinction without a difference, for
it was urged that the value of the other segments of the land in
Penn Central should be disregarded when the extent of the
diminution of value of the air rights was calculated. At bottom,
the issue in Penn Central and cases where a fee has been divided
into segmented interests is no different. Had the air rights of
Penn Central been sold to another corporation by some graceful
exercise of the art of conveyancing, would the Court have found
the city ordinance to have been a taking because it totally
extinguished the value of those severed rights?' 8 ' One suspects
that it would not. Nor should the court find a taking where a
private contract has severed mineral interests from a fee.

,s Id. at 130. (citations omitted). See also, Pennsylvania Coal, where Justice
Brandeis opined in dissent:
It is said that one fact for consideration in determining whether the limits
of the police power have been exceeded is the extent of the resulting
diminution of value, and that here the restriction destroys existing rights
of property and contract. But values are relative. If we are to consider the
value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it
with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not
of the coal alone, but of the whole property. The rights of an owner as
against the public are not increased by dividing the interests of his property
into surface and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not be
greater than the rights in the whole.
260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
" Keystone addressed a subterranean version of this question. Unlike Pennsylvania
Coal, in Keystone the law was a valid exercise of the power directed at the regulation
of a nuisance. Said Justice Stevens: "Petitioners . . . argue that . . . the Subsidence Act
.. entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate. It is clear, however, that
our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a
bundle of property rights." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500
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Justice Brandeis' dissenting observations in Pennsylvania Coal
were brilliantly prescient on this point:
The estate of an owner in land is grandiloquently described as
extending ab orco usque ad coelum. But I suppose no one
would contend that by selling his interest above one hundred
feet from the surface he could prevent the State from limiting,
82
by the police power, the height of structures in the city.

With equal cogency, Justice Brandeis then asked rhetorically:
"And why should a sale of underground coal rights bar the
State's power?'

'18

3

This is precisely the question to be asked with regard to a
Section 522(e) limitation; why, indeed, should the provisions of
a private sale of underground rights, reflecting a legal fiction
that the property was somehow severed into segments, defeat
the public's valid interest in suppressing noxious uses and nuisances?
One answer is that, in the parlance of the Court's modern
takings analysis, the regulation may defeat "distinct investment
backed expectations." 84 While in Penn Central, a case involving
a non-nuisance "innocent use," such concerns make good sense,

,82
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting). Lest one be
inclined to cavalierly dismiss the weight of a dissenting opinion, it should be recalled
that Keystone tells us that Holmes and Brandeis substantially agreed on the breadth of
the police power in Pennsylvania Coal. They disagreed only on whether the Kohler Act
actually was a legislative effort to suppress nuisance activity, as Brandeis strongly
contended, or as Holmes found, a measure to bestow an economic benefit on private
parties--which was not a valid exercise of the power. Keystone 480 U.S. at 488, n. 17.
183
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis
also came to grips with the "reciprocity of advantage" theory relied on by Holmes' in
Pennsylvania Coal. This theory suggests that a taking occurs unless a property owner
acquires some reciprocity of advantage, i.e. while zoning limits use of ones property, it
bestows the benefit of living in a planned, safe community. Said Brandeis:
[W]here the police power is exercised, not to confer benefits upon property
owners, but to protect the public from detriment and danger, there is no
room for considering reciprocity of advantage. There was no reciprocal
advantage to the owner prohibited from using his oil tanks in [Pierce Oil
Corp. v. City of Hope,] 248 U.S. 498 (1919); his brickyard, in [Hadacheck
v. Sebastian,] 239 U.S. 394. (1915); his billiard hall, in [Murphy v. California,] 225 U.S. 623 (1912); his oleomargarine factory, in [Powell v.
Pennsylvania,] 127 U.S. 678 (1888); his brewery, in [Mugler v. Kansas,]
123 U.S. 623 (1887); unless it was be the advantage of living and doing
business in a civilized community. That reciprocal advantage is given by
the act to the coal operators.
Id. at 422.
I" See e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:473

in a case where an activity that has the potentially to substantially harm people and a fragile environment, this inquiry is
irrelevant.
Keystone reflected on more than a century of caselaw extending back to Mugler, s5 observing that "[ljong ago it was
recognized that 'all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."" '1

86

Surely, citizens have no constitu-

tionally cognizable expectation (investment backed or otherwise)87
to conduct noxious or nuisance-like activities on their property.
A rejoinder, however, might be that the government has
changed the rules of the game, so to speak--by making illegal
an activity that was previously perfectly legitimate. By so doing,
the property owner, who gave valuable consideration for a severed mineral interest, is unfairly deprived of the total value of
his or her property; a deprivation which serves to increase the
value of adjoining and super-incumbent tracts which are no
longer burdened by exposure to the theretofore legal use.
Changing times, mores, and new information, however, have
long been observed to mold the objective and subjective fairness
of legislative initiatives under the police power. As Justice Holmes
pointedly remarked, the police power is grounded upon shifting
sand:
Lotteries were thought useful adjuncts of the State a century
or so ago; now they are believed to be immoral and they have
been stopped. Wine has been thought good for man from the
time of the Apostles until recent years. But when public opinion changed it did not need the 18th Amendment, notwithstanding the 14th, to enable a state to say that the business
should end. What has happened to lotteries and wine might
happen to theatres in some moral storm of the future, not
because theatres were devoted to a public use, but because
people had come to think that way. 88
Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-492, quoting, Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665.
'"
This observation is obviously as applicable to segmented property interests as to
a fee interest.
88 Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1926) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
Tyson involved an abortive attempt by the State of New York to regulate theatre ticket
scalping. The State attempted to justify the law as against a substantive due process
taking attack by arguing that the theatre business was clothed with a public interest,
like the arguments made to defend rate-making for railroads and public utilities. The
majority rejected the argument. Thus, Holmes' reference in the textual quote above, to
"theatres .. .devoted to a public interest."
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Holmes' statement reflects well established case law and
rather artfully describes the fragility of "investment-backed expectations" when exposed to the often harsh winds that frequently sweep across the modern "regulatory state."' 8 9 Viewed
in this light, it seems obvious that when a legislature finds an
activity inimical to public health, safety, or welfare, the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the activity should not depend
on the extent of economic loss occasioned by its enforcement.
In essence, Section 522(e) declares that coal mining activities
within the boundaries of environmentally sensitive and publicly
revered federal lands are akin to Justice Sutherland's offensive
pig in the parlor. Whether the coal owner has "distinct investment-backed expectations" or will be deprived of the entire value
of his/her contractually severed mineral estate should have no
bearing on takings analysis. As long as the legislative means
utilized' 0 is rationally and substantially related to the end sought
to be achieved, no taking occurs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even the most strident proponent of rights of coal operators
should pause at the visions of huge coal mining "draglines"' 9'
with scoop buckets the size of a house thrusting deep into the
fragile soil of National Park land, of gigantic earth moving
machines hauling and dumping rocks ripped from the subsoil of
a Wildlife Refuge, or of rumbling tri-axle coal trucks loaded
with coal traversing a tree and soil-stripped ridge overlooking a

"I To add a modern twist to this perspective, one may focus on a literal exercise
of the police power. Cocaine, which had once been advertised in the Sears catalogue (as
an all-purpose elixir) became illegal overnight with the enactment of a law criminalizing
its use and possession. Who among us would argue for the cocaine dealer, that because
the entire value of his stash had been extinguished--indeed appropriated--that he is
entitled to "just compensation"? One might dismiss the analogy, suggesting that cocaine
use is a serious evil unlike coal mining. Of course the observations of Holmes quoted
in the text accompanying note 188, and the eighteenth century suppression of the evil
of lotteries and liquor suggest the aptness of the analogy. Unless, of course, one wishes
judges to sit as Lochnerian super-legislators.
11 The protection of important fragile public lands from noxious uses is the goal
of SMCRA § 522(e)(1) and (2).
A dragline is "[a] type of excavating equipment which casts a rope-hung bucket
a considerable distance, collects the dug material by pulling the bucket toward itself on
the ground with a second rope, elevates the bucket, and dumps the material ...." U.S.
BUREAU OF MINES, A DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL, AND RELATED TERMS (1968),
346. Some draglines are enormous; if feasible for a particular coal mine site, draglines
can provide significant economies of scale.
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wild and scenic river. Likewise with regard to private land, the
specter of blasting, subsidence, and dumping of coal refuse
within a stone's throw of a home or a school should present an
equally troubling picture, even for the hardened corporate advocate.
Basic values relating to how human beings treat each other
and simple common sense should lead an industry to eschew
such activities in close proximity to places where people live,
work and worship or in the midst of natural places that we, as
a nation, treasure--places which most of us pray are passed on
unblemished to future generations. When human beings are motivated by the balance sheets' bottom line, basic human values
and common sense often fall victim to greed. Mining in National
Parks and under homes and cemeteries are not scenes conjured
from the distorted imagination of environmental extremists; in
a decade of VER litigation, lawyers and coal operators have
argued that mining in such areas is a constitutionally protected
property right.
Congress clearly foresaw that such rights would be claimed
by coal interests. Given the penchant of certain elements in the
coal industry to ignore the environmental impacts of their work
and the rights of their neighbors, Congress sought to provide
broad protection for extremely sensitive areas where reasonable
people would deem mining a nuisance or noxious use.
The drafters of SMCRA sought to avoid unconstitutional
taking of private property in the administration of the statute,
out of an abundance of caution and with a measure of respect
for rights of property. Thus, prohibition of mining in certain
areas was tempered with an eye toward the concerns implicit in
the just compensation and due process clauses of the Fifth
Amendment.
Legislative history and common sense suggest that Congress
intended to restrain the regulatory impact of the Act generally,
and Section 522(e) in particular by avoiding unconstitutional
"takings" of private property--but only to the extent that such
regulation could be found violative of fifth amendment proscriptions. Thus, by limiting Section 522(e) mining bans by the
vague limitation "subject to valid existing rights" Congress gave
OSM flexibility in crafting implementing regulations which go
so far as to avoid takings--but no farther.192 In the final anal"' Given

the discussion above, I conclude that the current "modified all permits
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ysis, the SMCRA's statement of purpose emphasizes precisely
this point; OSM must assure that mining is conducted in a
manner that will be environmentally sound and wherever necessary, the agency should implement the Act by exercising "the
full reach of Federal constitutional powers to protect the public
interest. 193
With a new Administration in Washington, and competent
and fair-minded people at the helm of an agency previously
wracked with contention and partisanship, the OSM will, hopefully, develop a fair and reasonable regulatory approach to the
implementation of Section 522(e) of the SMCRA. In approaching this daunting task the agency should be mindful of the
thought expressed by the first Justice Harlan more than a century
ago:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use
in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is
very different from taking property for public use, or from
depriving a person of his property without due process of law.
In one case a nuisance ... is abated; in the other, unoffending
property is taken from an innocent owner. 194
Neither the law nor the demands of justice and fairness are,
nor should they be, different today.

test" is broader than necessary to escape a taking; it is however a test that is fair and
administratively workable. The test falls within the scope of the discretion afforded the
agency by the SMCRA.
SMCRA § 102 provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter to ... (d) assure that ... mining
operations are so conducted as to protect the environment;
(m) wherever necessary, exercise the full reach of Federal constitutional
powers to insure the protection of the public interest through effective
control of surface coal mining operations.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1202(d) and (m) (1988).
I" Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.

